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Abstract: In this paper, we explore the long-run effects of cultural and imperial legacies in the Baltic 
region. Drawing evidence from the 1897 population census in the Russian Empire, we find that 
localities with a higher share of German historical population are inclined to be more developed in 
contemporary Latvia and Estonia. Furthermore, based on the Life-In-Transition Survey (LiTS), we use 
robust regression discontinuity and identify persistent differential patterns of socioeconomic and 
political preferences across the borders of the former imperial territories of Estland, Livonia (Swedish 
Livonia), Letgallia (Polish Livonia) and Courland. Hence, we argue for the persistence of legacies as 
drivers of divergent development paths in the regions of Latvia and Estonia.  
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I. Introduction  
The Baltic region was the “ﬁrst German colony” according to Theodor Schiemann, a Baltic 
German writer and history professor (Wezel, 2017b). For nearly seven hundred years, Germans formed 
the elite that dominated the political, economic and social life in the Baltics, oppressing local 
population and preventing them from creating their own rule. Tabellini (2005) shows that prior 
political institutions and literacy rates at the end of 19th century are important determinants of regional 
social capital (trust, respect, confidence) and contemporary economic performance in Western Europe. 
Easterly and Levine (2016) find a remarkably strong impact of colonial European settlement on 
development and they identify human capital as the main channel in that direction. Spolaore and 
Wacziarg (2013) argue that a higher proportion of descendants from technologically more advanced 
territories 500, or even 1,000, years ago leads to higher income per capita in these territories nowadays. 
Furthermore, the variation in degrees of administrative centralization and the adoption of agriculture 
across ancestral populations offer complementary definitions of state history and its growth-enhancing 
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effects. As data about ancestry per se are rarely available, data on ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization/polarization or genetic distance are used as proxy indicators for cultural relatedness. 
In their paper on linguistic heterogeneity and political economy outcomes, Desmet et al. (2009) show 
that deep linguistic differences cause conflicts of interests, such as civil conflict and redistribution, 
whereas finer linguistic differences matter for economic growth and the provision of public goods. 
Lameli et al. (2015) test the effect of language on intra-regional trade in Germany. They find that 
similarities in historic local dialects have a sizable and significant positive impact on trade between 
regions in Germany. Even if language differences have become negligible, cultural differences persist 
and influence economic behavior. Last but not least, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) analyze data from 
1870 to 2005 and show that a relative genetic distance to the technological frontier predicts income 
differences. Similarly, genetic heterogeneity within populations has been shown to bring both 
advantages (higher specialization and productivity) and costs (lower trust and coordination). 
To explore the German effect on long-run economic development in the Baltic region, we 
concentrate on institutions, human capital, and non-economic factors of economic growth. A large 
body of literature focuses on the role of institutions in economic performance, including contributions 
by North (1990, 1994), Michie (1994), Williamson (1995), Greif (1998, 2000), Acemoglu et al. (2002, 2005, 
2006), Djankov et al. (2003) and Hodgson (2004). Institutions are socially approved models of collective 
behavior that are formed in the long-run and transmitted between generations (Greif, 1998; Greif, 2000; 
North, 1990; North, 1994). The idea of institutions as a determinant of economic performance goes back 
to 18th century Scottish Enlightenment and Adam Smith (1776), who wrote that “commerce and 
manufactures, in short, can seldom flourish in any state in which there is not a certain degree of 
confidence in the justice of government” (p. 909). However, Max Weber at the beginning of the 20th 
century was the first to outline the role of culture in economic performance by advocating that the 
Protestant ethic had led to the rise of the modern capitalism. He also compared the Western and 
Chinese law traditions and argued that rational Western law facilitated economic development in 
Europe (Horwitz and Boettke, 2005). Related research has underscored the importance of institutions as 
compared to other growth-enhancing factors such as geography, trade, physical capital stock, human 
capital (Rodrik et al., 2004; Hall and Jones, 1999), the role of institutions in the Industrial Revolution 
and the evolution of modern economics (Crafts and Mills, 2009; Galor and Weil, 2000; Hansen and 
3 
 
Prescott, 1998; Bogart et al., 2010; Persson, 2010), as well as the long-run effect of institutions once 
created in European colonies on contemporary economic performance of those territories.3 
Further evidence on the role of institutions and culture in economic performance is provided by 
quasi-experimental methods that may identify similarities or differences in communities that used to 
belong in a homogenous society but were divided by a “political” border in the context of a historical 
natural experiment. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2010) compare economic outcomes in African 
regions belonging to the same ethnic group with distinct pre-colonial institutions, but divided by 
national borders at the end of the 19th century. They show that ethnic pre-colonial institutions are 
closely related to contemporary regional development. Furthermore, Europe offers a good example of 
the creation of such “political” borders due to the incorporation of Eastern and Southern European 
territories into the European superpowers – Prussian, Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman empires – 
before World War I. This unique history of political fragmentation allows the persistence of imperial 
cultural heritage at a micro-level to be tested. Grosjean (2011b) explores the impact of cultural 
integration of 21 Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European states into the four empires before 
World War I. She uses sub-national data to show that imperial legacies persist through culture, in terms 
of social trust, whereas more recent history, such as that of the USSR, European Union or contemporary 
nation states, is not associated with significant differences at the level of general trust. More specific 
research on cultural legacies of empires has been carried out by Becker et al. (2016), who show that the 
inclusion of a territory in the Habsburg Empire, with its well-functioning bureaucracy and a high level 
of rule of law, has left a long-lasting effect in five European countries (Poland, Ukraine, Romania, 
Serbia and Montenegro). Communities living in a former Habsburg location experience higher levels of 
trust and less corruption than their counterparts residing on the other side of the former border. 
Furthermore, Grosjean (2011a) argues that the legacy of the Ottoman Empire caused a delay in the 
financial development of Southeastern Europe in terms of bank penetration. 
As mentioned earlier, imperial borders split contemporary European states and therefore 
allowed the identification of imperial legacies within one particular country. Modern Poland offers an 
outstanding setting, as it was divided by the Habsburg, Russian and Prussian Empires. As Grosfeld 
and Zhuravskaya (2014) point out, there are persistent differences in religious practices and beliefs in 
democratic ideas in Polish communities around the former borders. Poles are less religious in the 
“Russian” zone of Poland due to the oppression of the Catholic Church by the Russian Empire (ibid.). 
                                                          
3 For the core argument, see Acemoglu et al. (2002) “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the 
Making of the Modern World Income Distribution”. 
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Furthermore, people living in the “Austrian” zone have a more positive attitude towards democracy, 
suggesting that the administrative, cultural, and political autonomy granted by the Habsburgs have 
created a persistent legacy of democracy (ibid.). Peisakhin (2012) observes that Ukrainians living in the 
“Habsburg” zone of Ukraine are more pro-European, whereas the population on the side of the former 
Russian Empire is more oriented towards Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
Moreover, Grosfeld et al. (2011) identify a Jewish cultural legacy in the territories of Eastern Europe 
that belonged to the Russian Empire (Pale of Settlement); local communities having a Jewish minority 
developed an anti-market culture and bonding trust due to their living side-by-side with an ethnic 
group, which they perceived as rival. 
In this paper, we find that there is a robust Baltic German effect that predicts contemporary 
socioeconomic development in Latvia and Estonia. Instrumented by the distance to Riga/Reval 
(Tallinn), the Baltic German share of the 1897 general census of the Russian Empire is associated with 
higher levels of income, literacy and higher education. Furthermore, implementing a robust regression 
discontinuity approach across the former imperial borders of Courland-Livonia, Lettgallia-Livonia and 
Estland-Livonia, we argue that the Swedish imperial legacy is more conducive to political openness 
and socioeconomic development than the Polish imperial legacy or an intermediate independence 
status, as in the case of Courland, which was formally part of the Polish Empire, but de-facto 
independent.   
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers the historical background about the German 
effect on long-run economic development in contemporary Latvia and Estonia and discusses the border 
changes linked to overlapping imperial rules in the Baltic region. Section 3 presents our data and 
empirical strategy. In Section 4, we analyze our main results and robustness checks. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
II. Historical Background: Baltic Germans & Conflicts of Empires  
Baltic Germans as economic elites  
By the end of the 12th century, Indo-European Balts and Finno-Ugric tribes living in the territory of 
contemporary Latvia and Estonia were the last pagans in Europe (Kasekamp, 2010, Piirimae, 1997). 
During the following centuries, these territories experienced an intense interaction with the 
neighboring powers – Germans, Swedes, Poles, Danes and Russians – and therefore became a 
“heterogeneous, multi-ethnic space, homeland, and emotional place of belonging for many ethnic 
groups, including Germans” (Wezel, 2017a).  
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The Baltic Germans arrived in the 13th century when the territory of contemporary Latvia and 
South Estonia was conquered by German crusaders. At the same time, Danes and Swedes participated 
in the Christianization of North Estonia. Nevertheless, when North Estonia was sold to the Teutonic 
Order in the mid-fourteenth century after a short period of Danish rule, Baltic Germans became the 
dominant power in the region. They established the feudal-based Livonian Confederation, where 
native people (the Undeutschen) where subordinated to German colonizers (the Baltischen, the Balten). 
Although initially some local rulers were co-opted as vassals of the Livonian Confederation, they were 
soon assimilated by German nobility (Kasekamp, 2010; Piirimae, 1997). 
Baltic German elites, initially consisting of 200-300 knights along with noble men, clergymen 
and merchants, remained an integral part of local societies in the contemporary territory of Latvia and 
Estonia from the 12th century until 1939-1941, when they were resettled by Nazi Germany. Although 
the proportion of Baltic Germans rarely exceeded 8%, for about 600 years Baltic German landed 
nobility, town elite and clergymen dominated the economic, political and cultural life of the region. 
They owned large portions of lands, leased state estates, controlled municipal governments and 
dominated craft organizations as well as the Lutheran church (Plakans, 1974; Kasekamp, 2010; 
Raudkivi, 2011; Raun, 1991; Bolin & Douglas, 2017). 
However, being a member of the Baltic German community was primarily an indicator of social 
status, not ethnicity. The German-speaking elite assimilated Danes, Swedes, English, Scots, Poles, 
Hungarians, Jews and others. Until the end of the nineteenth century, cultural Germanization was also 
a phenomenon signaling upward social mobility for Latvians and Estonians (Wezel, 2017a; Wezel, 
2017b; Bolin & Douglas, 2017; Plath, 2017). The relationship among these ethnic groups was always 
tense, because the locals viewed Baltic Germans as masters and oppressors. Nevertheless, due to their 
wealth, education and influence, Baltic Germans left a significant impact. German culture and language 
was admired and held prestigious by the local population, as the transfer of customs and linguistic 
borrowing confirms (Alenius, 2002). Acquiring German language and culture was an integral part of 
gaining a higher social status. Even the first generation of Latvian and Estonian nationalists 
communicated with each other in German (Wezel, 2017b; O’Connor, 2003; Kasekamp, 2010). 
The Lutheran church also played an important role in the development of education in the 
region. During the Swedish period (17th-18th century), elementary schools were established for peasants 
and the first books (Lutheran religious texts) were published in Estonian and Latvian (Piirimae, 1997). 
These educational efforts led to a high literacy rates in the Lutheran regions, reaching 92% in Latvia 
and 96% in Estonia in 1897, whereas in Catholic Lettgallia, a former territory of the Polish-Lithuanian 
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commonwealth, the literacy rate was only 58% (Kasekamp, 2010). Moreover, among Baltic German 
pastors and tutors were to be found the first critics of serfdom, helping to spread the ideas of 
Enlightenment in the Baltic region, as well as the first promoters of local cultures, thus preparing the 
grounds for to the national awakening in the second half of the 19th century (Raun, 1999). 
 
Border Changes in the Baltics 
Although initially being parts of the same political entity, i.e. the Livonian Confederation, the 
four regions of the Baltics – Estland, Livonia, Courland and Lettgallia – followed a different historical 
route later on (Figure 1). These turbulent times shaped distinct historical institutions and hence led to 
differences across local cultures.  
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Figure 1: Historical regions of the Baltics: Estland, Livonia, Courland and Lettgallia 
 
Source: Own maps. Borders of governorates, towns and districts in 1898 and borders of sub-municipal units (in 
Latvia) and municipalities (in Estonia) today. 
The Livonian Confederation, which lasted from the 13th till the 16th century, was well integrated 
in European economic life by producing grain, wax, furs, flax and timber. In the mid-13th century 
German and Scandinavian merchants established the Hanseatic League that fostered international 
trade, leading to a trade relationship with more than 100 towns and outposts two centuries later 
(O’Connor, 2003). When Reformation ideas reached the Baltics at the beginning of the 15th century, 
8 
 
Lutheranism became the leading religion in Livonian territories. However, economic and social life in 
the Baltics did not modernize along with that of Western Europe, as the enserfment of local population 
occurred in the 15th and 16th centuries and continued till the 18th century (O’Connor, 2003; Kasekamp, 
2010; Oberlender, 2012). 
The Livonian Confederation lasted till the mid-16th century. The once economically prosperous 
Livonia gradually became a loose religious-political union with weak administration, regular peasant 
revolts and persistent conflicts between the Livonian branch of the Teutonic Order, Livonian Bishops, 
the Hanseatic cities and vassals. The Lutheran reformation contributed to the collapse of the 
confederation as part of the Teutonic Order remained sympathetic to Catholicism. Finally, the Livonian 
Confederation dissolved during the Livonian Wars, which started with the Muscovite expansion in 
1558 (O’Connor, 2003; Kasekamp, 2010; Jacobson, 2011). 
In 1561, most of Livonia came under Polish-Lithuanian rule, with the exception of North 
Estonia, which placed itself under Swedish protection, and Øsel (Saaremaa), which remained under 
Danish rule until 1645. From 1558 to 1721 Muscovy, Sweden and Poland-Lithuania competed for 
domination in the Baltic region (O’Connor, 2003: Kasekamp, 2010; Piirimae, 1997; Raun, 1991). Table 1 
outlines the ruling regimes in the Baltic regions from the 13th century until 1918. 
Table 1: Imperial rule in the Baltics 
Region 13th – 16th century The Swedish, Polish and 
Danish rule 
The Russian Empire Present 
North 
Estonia 























1721-1918 Livonia Latvia 
(Vidzeme) 
Lettgallia Polish Livonia 
1562–1772 












Notes: *Vassals to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
With the Peace of Altmark in 1629, the north-east Livonian territories (contemporary Estonia 
and Vidzeme in Latvia) also became a part of the Swedish realm and experienced a modernization in 
political, economic and social life. Despite the protests of the local nobility, the Swedish realm 
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attempted repeatedly to install its own political, judicial and social order in Livonia. The agrarian 
legislation developed differently to that in other parts of the former Livonian Confederation, returning 
more than a half of the arable land to the realm. The rights of the nobility were restricted, improving 
the regulation of the relationship between the landlords and the peasants. The Swedish realm also 
announced the abolition of serfdom, but this reform did not have sufficient time to be implemented. As 
a result, education was the most important Swedish heritage in the area, with the establishment of 
elementary schools and the foundation of a teachers’ seminary and a university in Dorpat (Tartu) being 
the most prominent achievements. Moreover, expansion of education contributed significantly to the 
development of a written Latvian and Estonian language with German and in the case of Estonian – 
also Swedish – influence (Kasekamp, 2010; Oberlender, 2012; Piirimae, 1997). 
However, modernization attempts in Estonia and Vidzeme came to an end after a century. At 
the beginning of the 18th century, Russia attempted to conquer Livonia again. The Great Northern War 
resulted in Russia’s annexation of Livonia and Estonia and an end to Swedish rule (Lewitter, 1968). The 
Peace Treaty of Nystad (Uusikaupunki) in 1721 confirmed Russian domination in the Baltic provinces. 
The estates continued to be run by German nobles, as Peter I provided vast privileges to the Baltic 
Germans. However, from the reign of Catherine II (1762-1796) on, the state begun to force its own 
interests more actively (Seppel, 2009). 
At the same time, the Duchy of Courland as well as the southeastern parts of Livonia 
(Lettgallia) remained parts of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Kasekamp, 2010). Polish rule in 
Courland was formal, as the area was widely autonomous. During the reign of Duke Jakob (1642-1682), 
Courland owned an impressive navy, a merchant fleet and manufacturing facilities. It even acquired 
two colonies, one in Africa (Gambia) and one in the Caribbean (Tobago) (Kasekamp, 2010; Jekabsons, 
2012). Despite these achievements, the Duchy of Courland stagnated. It did not experience any 
significant modernization due to a constant political power dispute between the duke and the nobility. 
There was also no external pressure to modernize, unlike that under the strong influence that Swedish 
rule had over Estland and Livonia (Oberlender, 2012). The German nobility maintained its rights with 
German remaining the leading language (Kamusella, 2013). Finally, the Duchy of Courland, a fief of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, requested annexation to the Russian Empire in 1795 (Plakans, 
1974). 
Turning to the south of the Baltics, Lettgallia became a part of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth in 1562 when the local elite swore allegiance to the Polish-Lithuanian crown in fear of 
Ivan the Terrible. Unlike Courland, Polish Livonia (also called the Inflanty Voivodeship) was 
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integrated in the Commonwealth and remained under Polish influence for four centuries. It developed 
an identity distinct from the rest of the former Livonian territories, becoming mainly a Catholic 
province. Religion played an important role in shaping the ethnic character of its inhabitants. For 
example, in Letgallian literature priests are portrayed very positively as kind-hearted advisors, unlike 
in other Latvian regions. Letgallians are also characterized by a higher degree of collectivism, which is 
linked to their Catholic heritage. The nobility in Polish Livonia was more mixed, as it included Polish, 
Lithuanian, German and Eastern Slavic landed nobility. The population consisted of substantial 
Russian, Belorussian, Polish and Jewish minorities and Polish was the language of the educated class. 
Moreover, a written language in Polish Livonia was developed by Jesuit fathers through the prism of 
the Polish language. Thus, written Latgallian dialect uses the letters y and w, which are not used in the 
written Latvian language (Kasekamp, 2010; Ivanovs and Soms, 2008; Plakans, 2011; Jekabsons, 2012). 
The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth collapsed at the end of the 18th century, with Polish Livonia 
becoming part of the Russian Empire as a result of the First Partition of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth in 1772 (Plakans, 1974). 
At the end of the 18th century all the territories of the contemporary Baltic states were 
incorporated into the Russian empire. In the governorates of Courland, Livonia and Estland, German 
nobles retained their traditional rights. However, Baltic peasants were granted personal freedom as 
serfdom was abolished in 1816 in the Governorate of Estland, in 1817 in Courland and in 1819 in 
Livonia. Lutheranism remained the dominant religion and German the dominant language in the 
region. In return, the German nobility showed loyalty to Russian rule. They often took high posts in the 
Russian administration, especially in the military and diplomatic corps (Plakans, 1974; Kasekamp, 
2010). 
A different situation occurred in the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth territory 
(Lettgallia) that was seized by the Russians and became part of the Vitebsk Governorate. As Poles and 
Lithuanians rebelled twice against Tsarist rule in the first half of the 19th century, the Russian 
government introduced harsh Russification measures, establishing the use of the Russian language and 
promoting conversion to Orthodoxy. In 1864, the use of the Latin alphabet was prohibited when 
writing in Lithuanian or Latgallian as a symbolic gesture. However, it was still possible to use the Latin 
alphabet for Polish texts. Serfdom was abolished in 1861, much later than in the rest of the Baltic 
territories (O’Connor, 2003; Kasekamp, 2010; Kamusella, 2013). 
Furthermore, Estonia and the rest of contemporary Latvian territory (Governorates of Courland, 
Livonia and Estland) experienced attempts at Russification due to Russian authorities fearing that 
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Latvians and Estonians may become Germanized. From 1867 on, all official documentation in the Baltic 
territories had to be written in Russian. In 1887, Russian was made the official language of instruction, 
except for the lowest years in primary school. However, the national awakening in the mid-19th century 
had created a fertile soil for national self-confidence that resulted in resistance to Russification efforts, a 
liberation from the Baltic German cultural world and, finally, the establishment of independence in the 
Baltic States after the First World War and the collapse of the Russian Empire (O’Connor, 2003; 
Kasekamp, 2010; Raun, 1991). 
 
III. Data & Empirical Strategy 
Data  
We use three main sources of data: state data (including census) and data from official registries, 
survey data and geographic data. The choice of the data is strongly influenced by the need to match 
current statistical indicators with historical units (governorates and districts) of the Russian Empire. 
These units do not comply with contemporary administrative divisions. Hence, we have to use the 
highest possible level of aggregation that is statistically available (sub-municipal- or municipal-level 
data), assign each unit to a historical district and governorate, and then recalculate the statistical 
indicators into the historical units. GDP per capita is available only at the regional level. Therefore, we 
measure income by using the average wage, for which data is available at a sub-municipal level. 
State data & data from official registries: In Estonia measures of number of population, income, the 
higher education level, nationality and literacy at the municipal level (213 units) come from the official 
website of Statistics of Estonia. In Latvia we use specially requested 2000 and 2011 census data from the 
Central Statistical Bureau Latvia to measure education level, nationality and literacy at the sub-
municipal level (587 units). Last but not least, to calculate the proportions of nationalities in 1897, we 
use data from the First General Census of the Russian Empire of 1897 (breakdown of population by 
mother tongue) in 58 districts covering the territories of contemporary Latvia and Estonia. 
Data on population and income at the sub-municipal level in Latvia comes from the Latvian 
regional development indicators module. To construct the monthly average income level at the sub-
municipal level, we use data on personal income tax collected in each sub-municipal unit and the 
average effective tax rate of the personal income tax (13%), which is calculated as the proportion of 
collected personal income tax and the average gross income in Latvia. To measure the unemployment 
level, we use data on unemployed persons at the municipal (in Estonia) or sub-municipal level (in 
Latvia) from the Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund in Estonia and the Employment State 
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Agency in Latvia, respectively. The reason why we use sub-municipal data for Latvia and municipal 
data for Estonia is the size of those units. Latvia has only 119 municipalities and they do not comply 
with the borders of the former districts of the Russian Empire. In contrast, in Estonia the municipalities 
are much smaller and their borders do comply with the borders of the former districts of the Russian 
Empire. Furthermore, municipalities in Estonia and sub-municipalities in Latvia are similar in terms of 
size and number of inhabitants.  
The number of Lutheran churches is based on the information on the Lutheran congregations 
published in the websites of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Latvia and the Estonian Evangelical 
Lutheran Church. The election data of the last parliamentary elections comes from the Estonian 
National Electoral Committee and the State Electoral Office in Estonia (24 electoral units) and the 
Central Election Commission of Latvia (municipality level). We use only the voting data for the parties 
that entered the parliament in the last parliamentary elections in Latvia (2014) and Estonia (2015). As 
the majority of voters in Estonia and Latvia vote for center-right parties, we create two indicators that 
show the share of votes for center-left and the share of votes for the right-wing parties to illustrate the 
differences in political orientation. 
Survey data: We use individual-level responses from the Life in Transition Survey III (LiTS III) to 
construct measures of values and attitudes. The LiTS III is a household and attitudinal survey 
conducted between 2015 and 2016 in 34 countries. The survey includes more than 1400 households in 
48 sample points in Latvia and 42 sample points in Estonia (Figure 2). Firstly, we use responses to 
several questions of the survey to measure such values as trust, individualism, independence, risk 
taking and self-initiative. The measure of trust is based on responses to the question “Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing 
with people?” (4.03). Respondents give answers on a 5-point scale, with -2 meaning complete distrust 
and 2 meaning complete trust. To measure individualism and independence, we analyze responses to 
the following statements: “People should obey the law without exception (10 points) / There are times 
when people have good reasons to break the law (1 point)” (4.17d) and “In our country today, we 
should show more respect for our authorities (10 points) / As citizens, we should be more active in 
questioning the actions of our authorities (1 point)” (4.17e). And to measure self-initiative, we analyze 
responses to the following statements: “Willingness to take risks: Very much willing to take risks (10 
points) / Not willing to take risks at all (1 point)” (4.28). Secondly, we construct two measures to 
evaluate the attitudes toward market economy and democracy. These measures are based on the 
responses to the following statements: “A market economy is preferable to any other form of economic 
13 
 
system (1 point) / Under some circumstances, a planned economy may be preferable to a market 
economy (-1 point) / For people like me, it does not matter whether the economic system is organized 
(0 points)” (4.11) and “Democracy is preferable to any other form of political system (1 point) / Under 
some circumstances, an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one (-1 point) / 
For people like me, it does not matter whether a government is democratic or authoritarian (0 points)” 
(4.12). Last but not least, we create a measure to evaluate attitude towards inequality. This measure is 
based on the responses to the following statement: “The gap between the rich and poor in our country 
should be reduced” (4.01h). Respondents give answers on a 5-point scale, with -2 meaning strongly 
disagree and 2 meaning strongly agree. The localization of respondents is available at a sub-municipal 
level. We use individual-level data and also aggregate these measures to the level of districts of the 
Russian Empire in 1898. Data of 41 from 58 districts are available in this survey. 
 
 
Figure 2: Historical regions of Latvia and Estonia and the LiTS III locations 
 
Source: Own maps. Borders in 1898, borders of countries today, and location of the observations in the LiTS III 
dataset in Latvia and Estonia. 
Geographical data: We use a historical map of the governorates of Livonia, Estland and Courland 
produced in Riga in 1898 from the 1900 Map Collection to create digital maps of the governorates and 
districts of the Russian Empire in the territory of contemporary Latvia and Estonia (figure 3). The map 
also partly includes geographical data on the Vitebsk governorate, thus covering the full territory of 









Figure 3: Historical map of the Russian Empire governorates of Livonia, Estland and Courland in 1898 
 
Source: The 1900 Map Collection, www.discusmedia.com 
We assign each municipality (in contemporary Estonia) or sub-municipal unit (in contemporary Latvia) 
to one of the 57 districts and 4 governorates (Courland, Livonia, Estland and Vitebsk) of the Russian 
Empire. An exception is the district of Schlock, which has been merged with the Riga district as Schlock 
town became part of Jurmala town and separate statistics on this unit does not exist. The opposite has 
been done with Walk town that became a twin town of Valka (in Latvia) and Valga (in Estonia). If the 
municipality (in Estonia) or sub-municipal unit (in Latvia) is located in a territory of several districts of 
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the Russian Empire, we assign it to the district that corresponds to the largest part of the territory. We 
assign those municipalities or sub-municipal units that were parts of other Russian empire districts 
than the ones included in the governorates of Livonia, Estland, Courland and Vytebsk to the 
neighboring districts (3 units in Latvia and 3 units in Estonia). This strategy allows us to recalculate the 
contemporary statistical data into the historical units of the Russian Empire. Table 2 summarizes the 
basic information with respect to variables, units of measurement and data sources. The descriptive 




Table 2: Data description and sources 
Variable Unit Period Data source Notes 




Life in Transition Survey III Question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in 
dealing with people?” (4.03) 




Life in Transition Survey III Statement: “Willingness to take risks: Very much willing 
to take risks (10 points) / Not willing to take risks at all (1 
point)” (4.28) 




Life in Transition Survey III Statement: “People should obey the law without exception 
(10 points) / There are times when people have good 
reasons to break the law (1 point)” (4.17d) 




Life in Transition Survey III Statement: “In our country today, we should show more 
respect for our authorities (10 points) / As citizens, we 
should be more active in questioning the actions of our 
authorities (1 point)” (4.17e) 




Life in Transition Survey III Question: “To what extent do you trust the following 
institutions? The government/ cabinet of ministers (4.04b) 






Life in Transition Survey III Statement: “A market economy is preferable to any other 
form of economic system (1 point) / Under some 
circumstances, a planned economy may be preferable to a 
market economy (-1 point)” (4.11) 






Life in Transition Survey III Statement “Democracy is preferable to any other form of 
political system (1 point) / Under some circumstances, an 
authoritarian government may be preferable to a 
democratic one (-1 point)” (4.12) 






Life in Transition Survey III Statement “The gap between the rich and poor in our 
country should be reduced” (4.01h) 
Religion % 2015-2016 Life in Transition Survey III Question “What is your religion?” (9.22) 
Number of Lutheran 
churches 
- 2016 Evangelical Lutheran Church 
of Latvia, Estonian 
Evangelical Lutheran Church 
 






Estonian National Electoral 
Committee and the State 
Electoral Office (Estonia) 
Central Election Commission 
of Latvia  
Social Democratic Party (Estonia) 
Social Democratic Party "Harmony" (Latvia) 
Votes for right-wing 
parties 
% Conservative People's Party (Estonia) 
National Alliance, For Latvia From The Heart (Latvia) 
Proportion of 
Germans and other 
nationalities 
% 1897 First General Census of the 
Russian Empire 
Number of German (or other language) speaking persons / 
total number of persons 
Average monthly 





Statistics Estonia, Regional 
development indicators 
module (Latvia) 
In Latvia: personal income tax received in the territorial 
unit / effective tax rate (0,13) /12 




Statistics Estonia, Central 
Statistical Bureau Latvia 
Persons with tertiary education / all surveyed persons 




Statistics Estonia, Central 
Statistical Bureau Latvia 
Literate persons / all surveyed persons 




Number of unemployed persons / number of inhabitants 
Ethnic minority % 2011 Statistics Estonia, Central 
Statistical Bureau Latvia 
Non-Latvians or Non-Estonians / all surveyed persons 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Full sample Latvia Estonia 
N Min Max Mean SD N Min Max Mean SD N Min Max Mean SD 
Trust 2788 -2.00 2.00 -0.05 1.08 1874 -2.00 2.00 -0.12 1.07 914 -2.00 2.00 0.10 1.09 
Risk taking 2745 1.00 10.00 4.42 2.56 1843 1.00 10.00 4.57 2.56 902 1.00 10.00 4.11 2.53 
Obedience to law 2698 1.00 10.00 7.09 2.95 1803 1.00 10.00 6.99 2.95 895 1.00 10.00 7.27 2.93 
Respect for authorities 2654 1.00 10.00 3.29 2.58 1779 1.00 10.00 3.25 2.52 875 1.00 10.00 3.37 2.71 
Trust in government 2709 -2.00 2.00 -0.61 1.13 1829 -2.00 2.00 -0.72 1.08 880 -2.00 2.00 -0.38 1.19 
Prefer market to planned economy 2565 -1.00 1.00 0.00 0.76 1716 -1.00 1.00 -0.01 0.76 849 -1.00 1.00 0.01 0.77 
Prefer democracy to autocracy 2609 -1.00 1.00 0.24 0.80 1749 -1.00 1.00 0.18 0.82 860 -1.00 1.00 0.36 0.75 
Prefer more income equality 2729 -2.00 2.00 1.25 0.72 1839 -2.00 2.00 1.27 0.74 890 -2.00 2.00 1.21 0.68 
Catholic 2815 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.33 1897 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.39 918 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.10 
Lutheran 2815 0.00 1.00 0.28 0.45 1897 0.00 1.00 0.31 0.46 918 0.00 1.00 0.22 0.41 
Orthodox Christian 2815 0.00 1.00 0.24 0.43 1897 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.40 918 0.00 1.00 0.34 0.47 
Atheist 2815 0.00 1.00 0.29 0.45 1897 0.00 1.00 0.24 0.43 918 0.00 1.00 0.37 0.48 
Number of Lutheran churches 800 0 24 0.57 1.11 588 0 24 0.49 1.16 212 0 10 0.78 0.91 
Votes for center-left parties 143 0.01 0.69 0.13 0.13 119 0.01 0.69 0.13 0.14 24 0.06 0.29 0.16 0.05 
Votes for right-wing parties  143 0.03 0.04 0.24 0.08 119 0.09 0.38 0.27 0.06 24 0.03 0.20 0.09 0.04 
Income (2016) 800 317.23 1504.98 734.75 202.30 588 317.23 1460.33 644.89 142.73 212 749.15 1504.98 983.98 115.69 
Income (2015) 800 276.88 1442.50 683.87 197.71 588 276.88 1370.22 595.34 138.62 212 650.29 1442.50 929.43 110.19 
Income (2014) 800 226.94 1279.06 620.49 155.10 588 226.94 1279.06 567.46 137.87 212 554.71 1227.52 767.56 92.97 
Higher education 800 0.04 0.50 0.15 0.06 588 0.04 0.41 0.13 0.05 212 0.07 0.50 0.20 0.07 
Literacy 800 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.01 588 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.01 212 0.92 1.00 1.00 0.01 
Unemployment 800 0.00 0.21 0.05 0.03 588 0.01 0.21 0.06 0.04 212 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.01 
Ethnic minority 800 0.00 0.95 0.18 0.20 588 0.02 0.91 0.20 0.19 212 0.00 0.95 0.13 0.21 
Germans 58 0.21 36.85 10.04 10.60 39 0.21 36.85 10.73 11.56 19 0.67 26.03 8.62 8.38 
Jews 58 0.00 59.68 9.30 14.78 39 0.28 59.68 13.32 16.60 19 0.00 6.21 1.04 1.64 
Russians 58 0.10 36.01 7.76 9.89 39 0.10 36.01 9.22 11.48 19 0.36 15.98 4.79 4.22 
Poles 58 0.00 37.38 2.32 5.79 39 0.00 37.38 3.30 6.87 19 0.01 1.55 0.31 0.42 
Swedes 58 0.00 5.81 0.18 0.80 39 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01 19 0.00 5.81 0.53 1.35 
Notes: SD is standard deviation. 
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(1) Trust 1 -0.226 0.435** -0.107 0.570** 0.316* 0.277 0.058 -0.400** -0.110 -0.081 0.628** 
(2) Risk taking -0.226 1 -0.123 -0.022 -0.338* -0.200 -0.302 0.068 0.300 -0.329* 0.398* -0.272 
(3) Obedience to law 0.435** -0.123 1 -0.410** .0487** 0.247 0.342* -0.224 -0.360* 0.001 0.097 0.317* 
(4) Respect for authorities -0.107 -0.022 -0.410** 1 0.012 -0.119 -0.381* 0.053 -0.049 0.091 0.070 -0.085 
(5) Trust in government 0.570** -0.338* 0.487** 0.012 1 0.664** 0.614** -0.330* -0.653** 0.100 -0.309* 0.687** 
(6) Prefer market to 
planned economy 
0.316* -0.200 0.247 -0.119 0.664** 1 0.756** -0.295 -0.623** 0.360* -0.527** 0.527** 
(7) Prefer democracy to 
autocracy 
0.277 -0.302 0.342* -0.381* 0.614** 0.756** 1 -0.364* -0.562** 0.319* -0.445** 0.475** 
(8) Prefer more income 
equality 
0.058 0.068 -0.224 0.053 -0.330* -0.295 -0.364* 1 0.149 -0.064 0.066 -0.005 
(9) Catholic -0.400** 0.300 -0.360* -0.049 -0.653** -0.623** -0.562** 0.149 1 -0.504** 0.290 -0.680** 
(10) Lutheran -0.110 -0.329* 0.001 0.091 0.100 0.360* 0.319* -0.064 -0.504** 1 -0.611** -0.020 
(11) Orthodox Christian -0.081 0.398* 0.097 0.070 -0.309* -0.527** -0.445** 0.066 0.290 -0.611** 1 -0.366* 
(12) Atheist 0.628** -0.272 0.317* -0.085 0.687** 0.527** 0.475** -0.005 -0.680** -0.020 -0.366* 1 
(13) Number of Lutheran 
churches 
0.018 -0.236 -0.057 -0.003 0.138 0.096 0.147 -0.026 -0.246 0.228 -0.222 0.193 
(14) Income (2016) 0.611** -0.058 0.342* -0.039 0.545** 0.420** 0.463** 0.145 -0.651** 0.109 -0.132 0.680** 
(15) Higher education 0.452** 0.011 0.307 -0.049 0.364* 0.110 0.254 0.105 -0.364* -0.231 0.226 0.425** 
(16) Literacy -0.176 0.104 -0.211 0.211 -0.161 -0.095 -0.131 0.091 0.181 -0.205 0.164 -0.174 
(17) Unemployment -0.500** 0.212 -0.286 -0.111 -0.531** -0.427** -0.378* 0.049 0.791** -0.402** 0.289 -0.623** 
(18) Ethnic minority -0.108 0.303 -0.037 -0.075 -0.361* -0.638** -0.436** 0.032 0.495** -0.640** 0.803** -0.446** 
(19) Germans 0.009 0.205 0.030 0.182 -0.019 0.080 0.044 0.068 -0.165 0.066 0.135 -0.012 
(20) Jews -0.105 0.192 -0.026 -0.015 -0.350* -0.466** -0.413** -0.133 0.542** -0.433** 0.408** -0.389* 
(21) Russians -0.115 0.356* 0.054 -0.254 -0.380* -0.553** -0.416** 0.061 0.693** -0.645** 0.556** -0.443** 
(22) Poles -0.037 0.211 0.051 -0.235 -0.325* -0.554** -0.366* -0.136 0.554** -0.433** 0.408** -0.413** 
(23) Swedes 0.398* -0.010 0.175 -0.056 0.303 0.215 0.281 0.067 -0.254 0.153 -0.184 0.269 
Notes: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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(1) Trust 0.018 0.611** 0.452** -0.176 -0.500** -0.108 0.009 -0.105 -0.115 -0.037 0.398* 
(2) Risk taking -0.236 -0.058 0.011 0.104 0.212 0.303 0.205 0.192 0.356* 0.211 -0.010 
(3) Obedience to law -0.057 0.342* 0.307 -0.211 -0.286 -0.037 0.030 -0.026 0.054 0.051 0.175 
(4) Respect for authorities -0.003 -0.039 -0.049 0.211 -0.111 -0.075 0.182 -0.015 -0.254 -0.235 -0.056 
(5) Trust in government 0.138 0.545** 0.364* -0.161 -0.531** -0.361* -0.019 -0.350* -0.380* -0.325* 0.303 
(6) Prefer market to planned 
economy 
0.096 0.420** 0.110 -0.095 -0.427** -0.638** 0.080 -0.466** -0.553** -0.554** 0.215 
(7) Prefer democracy to 
autocracy 
0.147 0.463** 0.254 -0.131 -0.378* -0.436** 0.044 -0.413** -0.416** -0.366* 0.281 
(8) Prefer more income 
equality 
-0.026 0.145 0.105 0.091 0.049 0.032 0.068 -0.133 0.061 -0.136 0.067 
(9) Catholic -0.246 -0.651** -0.364* 0.181 0.791** 0.495** -0.165 0.542** 0.693** 0.554** -0.254 
(10) Lutheran 0.228 0.109 -0.231 -0.205 -0.402** -0.640** 0.066 -0.433** -0.645** -0.433** 0.153 
(11) Orthodox Christian -0.222 -0.132 0.226 0.164 0.289 0.803** 0.135 0.408** 0.556** 0.408** -0.184 
(12) Atheist 0.193 0.680** 0.425** -0.174 -0.623** -0.446** -0.012 -0.389* -0.443** -0.413** 0.269 
(13) Number of Lutheran 
churches 
1 0.205 -0.007 -0.207 -0.200 -0.100 -0.448** -0.413** -0.300* -0.196 0.148 
(14) Income (2016) 0.205 1 0.792** -0.112 -0.758** -0.115 0.121 -0.342** -0.315* -0.319* 0.271* 
(15) Higher education -0.007 0.792** 1 0.181 -0.491** 0.280* 0.258 -0.056 0.056 -0.058 0.076 
(16) Literacy -0.207 -0.112 0.181 1 0.086 0.029 0.486** 0.312* -0.027 -0.261* -0.339** 
(17) Unemployment -0.200 -0.758** -0.491** 0.086 1 0.368** -0.227 0.379** 0.639** 0.310* -0.179 
(18) Ethnic minority -0.100 -0.115 0.280* 0.029 0.368** 1 -0.075 0.346** 0.695** 0.515** -0.070 
(19) Germans -0.448** 0.121 0.258 0.486** -0.227 -0.075 1 0.102 -0.168 -0.119 -0.134 
(20) Jews -0.413** -0.342** -0.056 0.312* 0.379** 0.346** 0.102 1 0.424** 0.352** -0.139 
(21) Russians -0.300* -0.315* 0.056 -0.027 0.639** 0.695** -0.168 0.424** 1 0.613** -0.113 
(22) Poles -0.196 -0.319* -0.058 -0.261* 0.310* 0.515** -0.119 0.352** 0.613** 1 -0.085 
(23) Swedes 0.148 0.271* 0.076 -0.339** -0.179 -0.070 -0.134 -0.139 -0.113 -0.085 1 
Notes: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05  
Historical German presence in the Baltic region 
At the end of the 19th century, 2.9 million inhabitants lived in the Baltics, of whom 170 thousand 
or 5.9% were Germans. The highest share of Germans was in Livonia and Courland (7.6%), whereas in 
Lettgallia the share of Germans was as low as 1%. Other significant minorities in the Baltics were the 
Russians (9.5%), Jews (4.4%) and Poles (2.3%). The Russian minority concentrated in Lettgallia, where 
their share reached 28.8%. Jews and Poles were present in higher numbers in Lettgallia (12.7% and 
6.2%) and Courland (5.6% and 2.9%). There was also a Swedish minority of 1.3% in Estland. Figure 3 

































Source: Own graphs. Data from the First General Census of the Russian Empire in 1897. 
As the results of the first general census of the Russian Empire in 1897 indicate, Germans as a 
ruling class were concentrated in towns, with 79 percent of them being urban. The share of German 
town elite, merchants and artisans in the Baltic towns reached on average 19.4 percent. In four towns of 
Western Latvia (Courland), the German minority accounted for more than 30 percent (Pilten, Bauske, 
Hasenpot and Goldingen). Towns such as Mitau, Windau and Libau in Courland, as well as Arensburg 
and Riga in Livonia had a German share of 20-30 percent. The population of most towns in the Baltics 
consisted of 10-20 percent Germans. An exception was Lettgallia in Southeast Latvia, where only 3.7 
percent of the town’s inhabitants were Germans, corresponding to their lowest share in the whole 
Baltic region. In absolute numbers, the highest German population concentration was observed in the 
largest towns of the Baltics. Riga had 67.3, Libau 15.4, Reval 10.4 and Mitau 9.7 thousand German 
inhabitants.  
In the countryside, the German minority was formed by the landed nobility, local clergymen 
and teachers, accounting for 1.6 percent overall. Again, there was a higher share of Germans in the 
Courland districts that surrounded the towns of Goldingen, Talsen, Hasenpot, Windau, Grobin, 
Tuckum and Mitau, as well as the Riga district and the Wended district in Livonia, accounting for 2-4 
percent of rural inhabitants. Figures 4-5 show a detailed distribution of the German minority in the 
Baltic districts of the Russian Empire. 
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Figure 4: Share of Germans in the Russian Empire Districts in 1897 
 
Source: Own maps. Data from the First General Census of the Russian Empire in 1897.  Borders of governorates, 
towns and districts in 1898 
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Notes: Grey columns indicate towns, while white columns rural areas. Striped columns show average indicators for 
the region, towns and the countryside. 




OLS and IV Approach  
Our research objective is two-fold. First, we intend to identify the long-run effect of the historical 
German population on contemporary socioeconomic development in the Baltics. We measure 
socioeconomic development at the sub-municipal level as average income level (average wage) for the 
years 2016 and 2015, while providing lags for 2015 and 2014, respectively. We also use literacy rates 
and the share of people with higher education as dependent variables, while conditioning for the 
spread of Lutheran Churches, the distance from Riga/Reval (historical name of Tallinn), the respective 
governorate (Courland, Lettgallia, Livonia, Estland) and the overall diversity share of non-
Latvians/non-Estonians in any historical district based on the 1897 general census of the Russian 
Empire. The analysis is performed on the level of Russian Empire districts, as it is the most detailed 
level where historical statistics on German presence are available. We use the following regression: 
i i i iOutcome GermanShare Xα β ε= + + , 
where Outcome indicates a contemporary outcome variable, X is the vector of control variables, 
i denotes the Baltic district of the Russian Empire, and ε is an error term. After performing our OLS 
estimations, we instrument the German share in each historical district with the distance to Riga or 
Reval/Tallinn; for Courland and Lettgallia we use the distance to Riga, for Estland the distance to 
Reval, and for Livonia we split the sample into two components and use the distance to Riga or the 
distance to Reval, depending on which one is shorter. In this way, we use the distance to either of the 
two major urban areas in the Baltic region in order to generate exogenous variation on the long-run 
economic effects of German historical presence. Big cities are usually significant magnets of economic 
and financial activity and this has certainly been the case for Riga and Reval/Tallinn, and was also 
before the Treaty of Nystad.  
 
Standard and Robust RDD approach 
After the collapse of the Livonian Confederation, the Baltic regions experienced different 
cultural-historical treatments under Polish and Swedish imperial rule, and after the Great Northern 
War, under the Russian Empire. This allows us to use quasi-experimental methods to identify 
differences in communities that were divided by a “political” border. We focus on the following three 
internal borders within contemporary Latvia and Estonia: Estland/Livonia, Courland/Livonia and 
Lettgallia/Livonia. To estimate whether affiliation with the historical regions of Estland, Livonia, 
Courland and Lettgallia has a lasting effect on socioeconomic development, personal values, political 
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and religious preferences, we follow the empirical strategy of Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015) and use 
a one-dimensional regression discontinuity model:  
1 1 2 3Region Distance Region Distancei i i i i i iOutcome Xα δ δ δ ε= + + + + , 
where Outcome indicates a contemporary outcome variable. Region is a dummy indicating whether the 
unit belongs to Estland/Courland/Lettgallia, depending on the particular data sample, with Livonia 
always being the comparison group. Distance is the distance from the center of the territorial unit to the 
border. X are control variables and ε is an error term. We use a sample of territorial units located within 
the immediate proximity of the border (60 km on both sides of the historical borders) thus ensuring 
that the territories are similar in terms of climate conditions, natural resources, infrastructure and 
economic opportunities. As a robustness check, we also use a wider band of 100 km (Figures A.1 and 
A.2 in the Appendix). 
The outcome variables include socioeconomic development indicators as the level of income 
(average wage), (log) unemployment and the share of people with higher education, as well as 
individual values and political preferences – general trust, risk taking, obedience to law, respect for 
authorities, trust in government and attitudes toward market economy, democracy and inequality. We 
also include the share of voters for center-left or right-wing parties and religious affiliation. The choice 
of controls depends on the level of analysis. For the analysis of values and political preferences, the Life 
in Transition Survey III allows us to use individual-level analysis, covering up to 863 individuals in the 
case of the Courland/Livonia border, 668 individuals in the case of the Estland/Livonia border and 296 
individuals in the case of the Lettgallia/Livonia border. Individual-level controls include higher 
education, gender, age, ethnicity (Latvian, Estonian or ethnic minority) and religious affiliation 
(Lutheran, Catholic, Orthodox Christian or atheist).  
Socioeconomic and political development indicators are also available at the level of counties in 
Estonia and sub-municipalities in Latvia. That allows us to compare 42 territorial units around the 
Courland/Livonia border, 22 territorial units around the Lettgallia/Livonia border and 17 territorial 
units around the Estland/Livonia border. Our methodology implies that former imperial borders prior 
to the Treaty of Nystad (1721), which transformed all these provinces into territories of the Russian 
Empire, drive the statistically significant discontinuous jumps in the political and socioeconomic 
variables of interest across the provinces of contemporary Latvia and Estonia. Tables A1 and A2 
provide an overview of the historical development of locality names and institutions in Courland, 







Baltic Germans & Socioeconomic development 
Becker and Woessmann (2010) argue for the existence of a Protestant effect on primary school supply in 
19th century Prussia. Based on the 1897 general census of the Russian Empire and sub-national data 
from Latvia and Estonia, we identify the existence of a German effect on contemporary socioeconomic 
development. The German effect holds in its bivariate relationship with current income, and its 
quantitative effect remains unchanged when we add geographic, cultural and historical controls such 
as distance from the capital city (Riga or Reval/Tallinn), the 1561 pre-Nystad region dummy, the 
number of Lutheran churches and the degree of diversity, which captures the multiplicity of 
language/ethnic minorities in a given municipal/sub-municipal unit. We observe that the statistical 
significance of the German effect on wealth is strengthened as our proposed OLS specifications become 
more detailed (Table 5). When we change the dependent variable from log average monthly wage as a 
proxy for current income to literacy rate, the German effect persists at the 1 percent level. This captures 
explicitly the association between Baltic Germans and urban location, where the higher rates of literacy 
are observed.  
Table 5: Baltic Germans and current income  






























   
Lettgallia   -0.209 
[0.053]*** 
  -0.055 
[0.132] 
Estland    0.062 
[0.039] 
  0.154 
[0.047]*** 
Courland   -0.149 
[0.032]*** 
  -0.165 
[0.048]*** 




























Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.074 0.349 0.631 0.106 0.086 0.074 
F-statistic of instrument in 1st stage    7.98 5.89 3.36 
Distance to Riga/Reval km 
(Coefficient from 1st stage) 






Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Russian Empire district level regression. Livonia is the 
reference group for Lettgallia, Estland and Courland. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The diversity 
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index is composed of the German, Jewish, Russian, Polish, Swedish and Lithuanian shares of the 1897 general 
census divided by the respective Latvian or Estonian share. Current income corresponds to the log-version of the 
2016 average monthly wage at the sub-municipal/municipal level.  
The highly significant effect of the German historical presence in Table 6 shows that the high 
literacy levels of Baltic Germans created an entrepreneurial and intellectual milieu that persisted after 
the relocation of Baltic Germans in the 1940s and the Sovietization of Latvian and Estonian economies 
in the 1950s. This explains also why the diversity index is continuously significant in Tables 5-7 at the 1 
and 5 percent levels; the strong long-run German effect on Baltic development corroborates the positive 
effect of diversity on economic performance and implies that the resilience of imperial economies 
depended on their capacity to be managed by and facilitate the financial and intellectual development 
of minorities. The association between the historical German share of 1897 and contemporary higher 
education rates implies that Baltic Germans facilitated the accumulation of an institutional endowment 
that not only differentiated Estonia and Latvia from Lithuania, whose ethnic composition was much 
less diverse and did not experience any Baltic German presence, but also set the conditions for 
economic growth. The Borcan, Olsson and Puttermann paper (2018) on the relationship between state 
history and economic growth also serves as an explanatory pattern for the treatment of Baltic Germans 
as an enhancing factor of both state history and diversity.  
Table 6: Baltic Germans and current literacy  






























   
Lettgallia   -0.031 
[0.021] 
  0.004 
[0.002]** 
Estland    0.044 
[0.024]* 
  0.0003 
[0.001] 
Courland   -0.068 
[0.013]*** 
  -0.0002 
[0.001] 




























Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.236 0.240 0.578 0.106 0.086 0.074 
F-statistic of instrument in 1st stage    7.98 5.89 3.36 
Distance to capital city (Riga/Reval) km 
(Coefficient from 1st stage) 






Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Russian Empire district level regression. Livonia is the 
reference group for Lettgallia, Estland and Courland. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The diversity 
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index is composed of the German, Jewish, Russian, Polish, Swedish and Lithuanian shares of the 1897 general 
census divided by the respective Latvian or Estonian share.  
 
Instrumental-variable specification with distance to Riga/Reval as instrument 
Both Becker and Woessmann (2009, 2010) and Cantoni (2012) use the distance to Wittenberg as 
an instrument to explain the concentric spread of Protestantism. In particular, Becker and Woessmann 
(2009, 2010) link it to the cost of traveling and the speed of informational diffusion through space. What 
we do here is instrument the German share of 1897 with the distance to one of the two capital cities in 
the Baltic region, Riga or Reval (Tallinn). The underlying logic for the selection of this instrument is the 
specific cultural profile of Baltic Germans, which would influence their selection of settlement with 
respect to the biggest city of their area. Riga and Reval were certainly the first-choice locational 
destinations for Baltic Germans. Contrary to other minorities such as Poles, Swedes, Russians and 
Lithuanians, Baltic Germans showed the highest inclination toward urbanization and occupations that 
involved activity in big cities. This is why the selection of the distance from the respective capital as an 
instrument accounts for an exogenous variation to the dispersion of Baltic Germans without the 
interference of general socioeconomic considerations. While the statistical significance of distance to 
Riga/Reval remains unstable in the OLS specifications, the opposite is observed in the IV 
specifications, where both the distance to Riga/Reval and the German share are statistically significant 
(see Tables 5-7).  
Table 7: Baltic Germans and current higher education  






























   
Lettgallia    -0.031 
[0.021] 
  0.018 
[0.044] 
Estland     0.044 
[0.024]* 
  0.073 
[0.022]*** 
Courland   -0.068 
[0.013]*** 
  -0.073 
[0.017]*** 




























Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.067 0.189 0.578 0.106 0.086 0.074 
F-statistic of instrument in 1st stage    7.98 5.89 3.36 
Distance to Riga/Reval km    -0.053 -0.047 -0.047 
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(Coefficient from 1st stage) [0.019]*** [0.019]** [0.026]* 
Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Russian Empire district level regression. Livonia is the 
reference group for Lettgallia, Estland and Courland. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The diversity 
index is composed of the German, Jewish, Russian, Polish, Swedish and Lithuanian shares of the 1897 general 
census divided by the respective Latvian or Estonian share.  
Evidence from the Anderson-Rubin Wald test and Stock-Wright LM test (see the F-statistic in 
Tables 5-7) suggests that the German share is a relevant factor to explain contemporary socioeconomic 
outcomes in Latvia and Estonia. Hence, distance to Riga/Reval appears to be a robust instrument for 
historical German dispersion in the Baltics, which does not explain the spread of other minorities and it 
is not directly linked to educational attainment or wealth. The German effect stays positively significant 
throughout the IV specifications of Tables 5-7, while the controls for the number of Protestant churches 
(not only Germans were Protestant) and ethno-linguistic diversity corroborate the strength of the 
German effect on the Baltics nowadays. The same observation holds when we replace current income 
of 2016 with the respective data for 2015 and 2014; the results remain more or less unchanged (see 
Tables A.3-A.4 in the Appendix). Each kilometer distance from Riga or Reval is associated with a 
German share that is 5 percent lower. Furthermore, the areas that used to have a higher share of 
Germans in the 1897 census have between 0.01 percent and 2 percent higher literacy and university 
graduate rates (Table 6 and 7), while the same observation holds for 0.2 to 0.3 log-income units in the 
historical German-populated areas in contemporary Latvia and Estonia (Table 5).  
To further check the robustness of the instrumented German share, we replace it with the 
remaining key minority shares of the 1897 general census of the Russian Empire: Jewish, Swedish, 
Russian and Polish (Tables A.8-A.19 in the Appendix). Although Baltic Jews were also rather urban and 
more educated than the respective Latvians or Estonians, there is no positive and statistically 
significant Jewish effect on contemporary socioeconomic development. The same observation holds for 
the Swedish share, particularly when we instrument it with distance to Riga or Reval. The Russian and 
Polish shares appear to have a negative effect on current socioeconomic performance. Nevertheless, 
this effect is neither consistent nor always statistically significant. The long-run economic significance 
of the historical German population in the Baltic region is therefore also corroborated with respect to 
other major cultural groups: the Jews who shared a similar socioeconomic profile with Baltic Germans, 
the Poles and the Swedes as the carriers of the two competing imperial legacies before the Treaty of 
Nystad, and the Russians as the subsequent colonizing Empire.  
 
Robust Regression Discontinuity  
To show the persistence of imperial legacies in contemporary Latvia and Estonia, we implement 
the robust regression discontinuity method introduced by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014, 2015, 
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2017); the key assumption underpinning this approach is that the political borders that emerged in the 
Baltics in the aftermath of the collapse of the Livonian Confederation were exogenously defined. There 
are four borders to be tested: the Livonia-Courland border, the Livonia-Estland border, the Lettgallia-
Livonia border and the Lettgallia-Courland border. Due to a highly limited set of observations in the 
LiTS III, the short Lettgallia-Courland border is excluded from the analysis. Moreover, we report 
results with officially registered income, higher education and literacy only for the Livonia-Courland 
border; the rest of the outcome variables that drive the results come from the LiTS III. While Lettgallia 
represents Polish imperial rule in the pre-Nystad historical context, Estland and Livonia provide 
evidence for the persistence of the Swedish imperial legacy. Courland is a more complex case because, 
on the one hand, it was independent until its inclusion into the Russian Empire in 1795 and, on the 
other hand, it was a nominal vassal of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. To be able to estimate the 
discontinuous jump across the borders for our outcome variables, we follow the Grosfeld and 
Zhuravskaya (2015) approach and select a bandwidth of 60 km on both sides of the border. The 
assumption is that if differences in prior imperial rule do not exist, no discontinuous jump will be 
observed.  
Table 8: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Courland vs. Livonia (1561 borders)  
Outcome Variable Method Coefficient  Std. Err.     z 95% Confidence Interval  
Income (LiTS III)  Conventional 0.106 0.281 0.38 -0.446             0.657 
 Bias-Corrected 1.259*** 0.281 4.48 -0.708             1.810 
 Robust  1.259 0.965 1.31 -0.632             3.149 
Income (Official Statistics)  Conventional -0.360*** 0.061 -5.86 -0.480            -0.239 
 Bias-Corrected -0.292*** 0.061 -4.75 -0.412            -0.172 
 Robust  -0.292*** 0.072 -4.03 -0.434            -0.150 
Higher Education (LiTS III)  Conventional -0.004 0.092 -0.05 -0.186             0.177 
 Bias-Corrected 0.271*** 0.092 2.93 0.090             0.452 
 Robust  0.271 0.316 0.86 -0.349             0.891 
Higher Education (Official Statistics)  Conventional -0.098*** 0.021 -4.65 -0.139           -0.057 
 Bias-Corrected -0.065*** 0.021 -3.11 -0.107           -0.024 
 Robust  -0.065** 0.027 -2.47 -0.117           -0.013 
Literacy  Conventional -0.001*** 0.0004 -2.97 -0.002           -0.0004 
 Bias-Corrected -0.001*** 0.0004 -3.27 -0.002           -0.001 
 Robust  -0.001*** 0.0005 -2.98 -0.002           -0.0005 
Trust in Government Conventional 0.209 0.210 1.00 -0.202            0.621 
 Bias-Corrected 0.334 0.210 1.59 -0.077            0.745 
 Robust  0.334 0.845 0.40 -1.322            1.991 
Market Economy Conventional -0.180 0.166 -1.08 -0.507           0.146 
 Bias-Corrected -0.673*** 0.166 -4.04 -0.999           -0.347 
 Robust  -0.673 0.611 -1.10 -1.870           0.525 
Democracy Conventional -0.243 0.191 -1.27 -0.616            0.131 
 Bias-Corrected -0.293 0.191 -1.53 -0.666           0.081 
 Robust  -0.293 0.730 -0.40 -1.724            1.139 
Income equality Conventional -0.312*** 0.171 -1.83 -0.647            0.023 
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Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bandwidth is 60 km.  
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 Bias-Corrected -1.927*** 0.171 -11.28 -2.262           -1.592 
 Robust  -1.927*** 0.598 -3.22 -3.099           -0.754 
Competition Conventional -0.990* 0.539 -1.83 -2.047          0.068 
 Bias-Corrected 1.082** 0.539 2.01 0.025          2.140 
 Robust  1.082 2.159 0.50 -3.150          5.315 
Center-Left Vote Conventional -0.059 0.039 -1.53 -0.135          0.017 
 Bias-Corrected -0.051 0.039 -1.30 -0.127          0.026 
 Robust  -0.051 0.055 -0.92 -0.158          0.057 
Right-wing Vote Conventional -0.008 0.015 -0.57 -0.038          0.021 
 Bias-Corrected -0.010 0.015 -0.70 -0.040          0.020 
 Robust  -0.010 0.020 -0.51 -0.050          0.029 
Respect for Authority Conventional 1.704*** 0.537 3.17 0.651          2.757 
 Bias-Corrected 3.729*** 0.537 6.94 2.675          4.782 
 Robust  3.729* 2.077 1.79 -0.343          7.800 
Law Obedience Conventional -1.782*** 0.609 -2.93 -2.975          -0.588 
 Bias-Corrected 2.709*** 0.609 4.45 1.515          3.902 
 Robust  2.709 2.571 1.05 -2.331          7.749 
Generalized Trust Conventional 0.258 0.213 1.21 -0.160          0.677 
 Bias-Corrected -1.136*** 0.213 -5.32 -1.554          -0.717 
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As Table 8 and Figure 6 indicate, the Livonia-Courland border appears to be the strongest of the three. 
The outcome variables of officially reported income, higher education and literacy are statistically 
significant mostly at the 1 percent level, while the income and literacy coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level with both bias-corrected and robust confidence intervals (CIs). Higher 
education (officially reported statistics) appears to be significantly higher in former Livonian rather 
than in former Courland territories by an average mean difference of -0.065, which is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level with a bias-corrected CI and at the 5 percent level with a robust CI. 
Furthermore, the historical border between Swedish-dominated Livonia and formally Polish, but in 
reality independent, Courland, seems to persist also when it comes to preferences for income equality 
and respect for authority. Respondents in former Livonian territories are much more inclined toward 
income equality and rejection of authority, whereas the opposite holds for respondents in former 
Courland areas. Preference for income equality persists significantly more with a difference of 1.927 
(with both bias-corrected and robust CIs at the 1 percent level), whereas respect for authority persists 
significantly less with a difference of 3.729 (with a bias-corrected CI at the 1 percent level and a robust 
CI at the 10 percent level) in the former Livonian region.  
It is obvious that the Livonia-Courland political border has generated long-run differences in 
socioeconomic development in favor of Livonia, which was under Swedish imperial rule. This is also 
reflected in the preferences for generalized trust and market economy, which generate statistically 
significant differences across the border at the 1 percent level. Using the robust regression discontinuity 
approach of Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (ibid.), we find that Baltic territories across the former 
Livonia-Courland border are wealthier, more progressive and with higher levels of socioeconomic 
development, if they happened to be Livonian and therefore under Swedish imperial rule; the mean 
difference in generalized trust is -1.136 and is significant at the 1 percent level with a bias-corrected CI, 
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while the mean difference in preference for market economy is -0.673 and also significant at the 1 
percent level with a bias-corrected CI.  
Table 9 and Figure 7 report and graph the results of robust regression discontinuity across the 
former Livonia-Lettgallia border. The imperial legacies were also different across this 1561 border. 
Sweden hallmarked the modernization and economic performance of Livonia, whereas Lettgallia was 
part of Poland. While there were not enough observations on officially reported income, higher 
education and literacy across the border, the third wave of the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS III) 
facilitated a sufficient set of observations for our analysis. There is an average mean difference in law 
obedience of -12.179, which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level with both a bias-corrected 
and a robust CI. This implies a higher commitment level to institutions in the former Livonian rather 
than Lettgallian territories of the Baltic region. Similarly, strong preferences for democracy and market 
economy are more likely to be observed on the Livonian side of the Livonia-Lettgallia border. 
Preference for market economy scores are higher in Livonia than in Lettgallia with a difference of 1.695, 
which is significant at the 1 percent level with a bias-corrected CI only, while the mean difference in 
preference for democracy is -0.995, which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level with a bias-
corrected CI as well. A statistically significant difference in trust in government across the border 
confirms the existence of a more advanced institutional and infrastructural legacy on the Livonian side 
of the border, which is due to Swedish imperial rule prior to the Treaty of Nystad.  
 
Table 9: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Livonia vs. Lettgallia (1561 borders)  
Outcome Variable Method Coefficient  Std. Err.      z 95% Confidence Interval  
Income (LiTS III)  Conventional    -0.065 0.340 -0.19 -0.732            0.602 
 Bias-Corrected    -0.319 0.340 -0.94 -0.986            0.348 
 Robust     -0.319 1.105 -0.29 -2.484            1.846 
Higher Education (LiTS III)  Conventional     0.087 0.176  0.49 -0.259            0.432 
 Bias-Corrected    -0.498*** 0.176 -2.82 -0.844           -0.152 
 Robust     -0.498 0.695 -0.72 -1.861            0.865 
Trust in Government Conventional   -0.285    0.517 -0.55       -1.298            0.729 
 Bias-Corrected -2.994***    0.517 -5.79       -4.008           -1.980 
 Robust     -2.994    2.003 -1.49        -6.921           0.932 
Market Economy Conventional   -0.452 0.381 -1.19 -1.198            0.294 
 Bias-Corrected -1.695*** 0.381 -4.45 -2.442           -0.949 
 Robust    -1.695 1.488 -1.14 -4.661           1.221 
Democracy Conventional    0.177    0.426  0.42 -0.658            1.012 
 Bias-Corrected -0.995***    0.426 -2.33 -1.830           -0.160 
 Robust    -0.995    1.582 -0.63 -4.095           2.106 
Income equality Conventional     0.043 0.261  0.16 -0.469           0.555 
 Bias-Corrected     0.314 0.261 1.20 -0.198           0.827 
 Robust      0.314 1.096  0.29 -1.834           2.463 
Competition Conventional    2.206*    1.187  1.86 -0.121            4.533 
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 Bias-Corrected   -0.704    1.187 -0.59 -3.030           1.623 
 Robust    -0.704    4.684 -0.15 -9.885           8.477 
Respect for Authority Conventional    -0.279    1.199 -0.23 -2.629            2.071 
 Bias-Corrected  -4.320***    1.199  3.60 1.970            6.670 
 Robust     -4.320    4.741  0.91  4.972           13.612 
Law Obedience Conventional -3.124*** 1.273 -2.45 -5.619           -0.628 
 Bias-Corrected -12.179*** 1.273 -9.57 -14.675          -9.684 
 Robust  -12.179*** 4.857 -2.51 -21.698          -2.661 
Generalized Trust Conventional   -0.056    0.436 -0.13       -0.911             0.799 
 Bias-Corrected   -0.278    0.436 -0.64 -1.134            0.576 
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The Livonia-Estland border reveals only low levels of statistical significance, which is explained 
by the fact that both Livonia and Estland were under the influence of Swedish imperial rule. For our 
theory of exogenous imperial borders to hold, this border is expected to have been the least significant, 
because both of its sides share the same imperial legacy (see Table 10 and Figure 8 below). There is a 
mean difference of 0.729, which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level with a bias-corrected CI 
and shows that respondents in Estland reveal a stronger preference for democracy than respondents in 
Livonia. Similarly, there is a mean difference of 0.370, which is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level with a bias-corrected CI and shows that respondents in Estland are wealthier than those in 
Livonia. However, we do not find any robust evidence for the long-run persistence of the Livonia-
Estland border. Both Estland and Livonia were parts of the Swedish Empire and this explains the 
limited – if any – significance of this imperial border for contemporary socioeconomic development in 
the Baltic region.  
To confirm the validity of our results, we perform several robustness checks. As Tables A.20-
A.22 indicate (see the Appendix), when we add controls in the robust regression discontinuity 
approach such as big city and capital agglomeration dummies, then our current results are significantly 
strengthened. On the Livonia-Courland border, the mean differences of 2.767 and -2.151 for respect for 
authority and law obedience, respectively, become statistically significant at the 1 percent level with a 
robust CI, with respondents on the Livonian side of the border being more likely to abide by law than 
respondents on the Courland side of the border. The opposite holds when it comes to respect for 
authority. Nevertheless, generalized trust scores higher on the Courland rather than on the Livonian 
side of the border, with a mean difference of 0.577, which is statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level with a robust CI. Hence, we corroborate the finding that former Swedish imperial rule is largely 
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more conducive to contemporary socioeconomic development in the Baltic region than de-facto 
independent status and Polish imperial rule.  
The Livonia-Lettgallia border also appears to be persistent when it comes to law obedience and 
preference for market economy, with Swedish imperial legacy generating a higher level of preference 
for market economy and enforcement institutions. Furthermore, the statistical significance of the 
Estland-Livonia border withers away when we add the controls of city agglomeration and big city 
dummies. Only the mean differences of 0.397 and 0.511 are robustly significant at the 10 and 1 percent 
levels respectively, when it comes to income and preference for democracy. Given the difference in the 
duration of Swedish imperial rule between Estland and Livonia (see Table 1), Estland reveals higher 
levels of socioeconomic development than Livonia, which is consistent with our initial hypothesis that 
former Swedish imperial rule is more conducive to socioeconomic development and progressive 
political preferences than former Polish imperial rule or an intermediate independent status.  
Table 10: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Estland vs. Livonia (1561 borders)  
Outcome Variable Method Coefficient  Std. Err.     z 95% Confidence Interval  
Income (LiTS III)  Conventional     0.350**    0.174  2.01  0.009           0.691 
 Bias-Corrected 0.370**    0.174  2.12   0.029           0.712 
 Robust      0.370    0.266  1.39 -0.151           0.891 
Higher Education (LiTS III)  Conventional     0.109    0.072  1.51        -0.032           0.250 
 Bias-Corrected  0.197***    0.072  2.73   0.029           0.338 
 Robust      0.197    0.120  1.63 -0.151           0.432 
Trust in Government Conventional    -0.031    0.248 -0.12  -0.517           0.456 
 Bias-Corrected    -0.440*    0.248  -1.77  -0.927           0.047 
 Robust     -0.440    0.375  -1.17 -1.174           0.294 
Market Economy Conventional    -0.246    0.155 -1.58  -0.551           0.058 
 Bias-Corrected    -0.088    0.155  -0.56  -0.392           0.217 
 Robust     -0.088    0.251  -0.35 -0.580           0.405 
Democracy Conventional     0.395***    0.154  2.57  0.094           0.697 
 Bias-Corrected  0.729***    0.154  4.74 0.428           1.031 
 Robust      0.729    0.247  2.96  0.246           1.212 
Income equality Conventional    -0.166    0.143 -1.16  -0.448           0.115 
 Bias-Corrected    -0.214    0.143  -1.49  -0.495           0.067 
 Robust     -0.214    0.215  -0.99 -0.635           0.207 
Competition Conventional     0.234    0.445  0.53 -0.638           1.107 
 Bias-Corrected     0.638    0.445  1.43        -0.235           1.510 
 Robust      0.638    0.654  0.98  -0.643           1.918 
Respect for Authority Conventional     0.931*    0.480  1.94        -0.010           1.873 
 Bias-Corrected     0.164    0.480  0.34        -0.778           1.105 
 Robust      0.164    0.735  0.22 -1.276           1.603 
Law Obedience Conventional    -0.413    0.684 -0.60  -1.754           0.927 
 Bias-Corrected    -0.352    0.684  -0.51  -1.692           0.989 
 Robust     -0.352    1.092  -0.32 -2.491           1.788 
Generalized Trust Conventional    -0.325    0.210 -1.55  -0.737           0.087 
 Bias-Corrected    -0.165    0.210  -0.79  -0.578           0.247 
 Robust     -0.165    0.330  -0.50 -0.812           0.481 
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Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bandwidth is 60 kms.  
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V. Conclusions  
In this paper, we have explored the effects of diversity on Baltic development with a focus on the effect 
of the German minority on contemporary socioeconomic development in Latvia and Estonia. 
Furthermore, we have analyzed the persistence of the territorial partition in the aftermath of the 
collapse of the Livonian Confederation in 1561. We have found significant results in both directions. By 
instrumenting the German population share of the 1897 general census of the Russian Empire with the 
distance to Riga/Reval, we find that higher shares of German population have a long-run positive 
effect on economic performance and human development in the Baltic regions, with the German effect 
persisting even when we replace in our OLS and IV estimations the German minority share with the 
Jewish, Swedish, Russian and Polish ones. The predisposition of the historical German population to 
spread toward the two main cities in the Baltic region underpins the positive German effect on 
contemporary socioeconomic outcomes, similar to Becker and Woessmann (2010) on Protestantism and 
Prussian economic development.  
The Treaty of Nystad (1721), which annexed the Baltic region to the Russian Empire in the 
aftermath of the Great Northern War, designated Russia as the successor of two prior imperial legacies, 
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Swedish and Polish imperial rule. Introducing a robust regression discontinuity approach, we find that 
the Livonia-Lettgallia and Livonia-Courland borders are much more persistent than that of Estland-
Livonia, mainly due to the different imperial legacies underpinning the first two borders. Swedish-led 
Livonia displays higher levels of socioeconomic development than Polish-led Lettgallia, while the 
Polish imperial legacy generates stronger preferences for authority and centralized governance. The 
differences in development and political preferences become more acute at the Livonia-Courland 
border. Despite its independence status, respondents in former Courland territories have political and 
socioeconomic preferences closer to respondents in former Lettgallian rather than in former Livonian 
or Estland territories. The Swedish imperial legacy, which explains the socioeconomic and political 
preponderance of Livonia over Courland and Lettgallia, also captures the higher levels of political 
openness and wealth in Estland compared to Livonia. The longer duration of Swedish imperial rule in 
Estland thus validates our initial hypothesis about the lasting effects of imperial borders, which is also 
supported by Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015).  
Diversity and empire have both generated positive legacies for long-run economic performance, 
social capital and political progress in the Baltic region. Rather than treating diversity and empire as 
mutually exclusive terms, we argue that they have produced phenomenal levels of growth and 
institutional development when complementary to each other. The British and Ottoman Empires are 
pertinent paradigms of this phenomenon, as opposed to the Russian and French ones. But this is the 
focus of another study.   
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Courland Mitau Jelgava 
Courland Bauske Bauska 
Courland Windau Ventspils 
Courland Pilten Piltene 
Courland Hasenpot Aizpute 
Courland Goldingen Kuldiga 
Courland Grobin Grobina 
Courland Libau Liepaja 
Courland Iluxt Ilukste 
Courland Talsen Talsi 
Courland Tuckum Tukums 
Courland Friedrichsstadt Jaunjelgava 
Courland Jacobsstadt Jekabpils 
Livonia Riga Riga 














Livonia Wenden Cesis 
Livonia Wolmar Valmiera 
Lettgallia Dunaburg Daugavpils 
Lettgallia Liuzjn Ludza 






Livonia Werro Voru 
Livonia Pernau Parnu 
Livonia Dorpat Tartu 
Livonia Arensburg Kuressaare 
Livonia Fellin Viljandi 
Estland Reval Tallinn 
Estland Baltischport Paldiski 
Estland Wesenberg Rakvere 
Estland Weissenstein Paide 
Estland Hapsal Haapsalu 
Table A.2: Main differences of the historical institutions in the Baltic regions 
Historical name Estland 
 
Livonia Courland Lettgallia 
Region today North Estonia Vidzeme (Latvia) 





















Literacy rate (1897) 95% 95% 92% 58% 
Governance during 
Swedish/Polish rule 
Modernized legislation, restrictions of 
nobility, rapid development of education 
during the Swedish reign 
No significant modernization 
Russification in the 
Russian Empire 
Milder measures, Russian as a language for official documentation 





prohibition of the 
Latin alphabet (1864) 
Abolition of serfdom 1816 1819 1817 1861 
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Table A.3: Baltic Germans and current income (2015) 






























   
Lettgallia   -0.293 
[0.060]*** 
  -0.239 
[0.104]** 
Estland    0.147 
[0.053]*** 
  0.180 
[0.048]*** 
Courland   -0.218 
[0.041]*** 
  -0.223 
[0.040]*** 




























Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.022 0.203 0.665 0.106 0.086 0.074 
F-statistic of instrument in 1st stage    7.98 5.89 3.36 
Distance to Riga/Reval km 
(Coefficient from 1st stage) 






Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Russian Empire district level regression. Livonia is the 
reference group for Lettgallia, Estland and Courland. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The diversity 
index is composed of the German, Jewish, Russian, Polish, Swedish and Lithuanian shares of the 1897 general 
census divided by the respective Latvian or Estonian share. Current income corresponds to the log-version of the 
2015 average monthly wage at the sub-municipal/municipal level. 
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Table A.4: Baltic Germans and current income (2014) 






























   
Lettgallia   -0.319 
[0.062]*** 
  -0.280 
[0.103]*** 
Estland    0.157 
[0.053]*** 
  0.181 
[0.049]*** 
Courland   -0.225 
[0.041]*** 
  -0.229 
[0.040]*** 




























Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.101 0.197 0.672 0.106 0.086 0.074 
F-statistic of instrument in 1st stage    7.98 5.89 3.36 
Distance to Riga/Reval km 
(Coefficient from 1st stage) 






Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Russian Empire district level regression. Livonia is the 
reference group for Lettgallia, Estland and Courland. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The diversity 
index is composed of the German, Jewish, Russian, Polish, Swedish and Lithuanian shares of the 1897 general 
census divided by the respective Latvian or Estonian share. Current income corresponds to the log-version of the 
2014 average monthly wage at the sub-municipal/municipal level. 
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Table A.5: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Courland vs. Livonia (1561 borders) – Bandwidth of 100 
km 
Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Outcome Variable Method Coefficient  Std. Err.     z 95% Confidence Interval  
Income (LiTS III)  Conventional    -0.124    -0.72 0.38 -0.461             0.213 
 Bias-Corrected     0.306* 1.78 4.48 -0.031             0.642 
 Robust      0.306 0.77 1.31 -0.470             1.082 
Income (Official Statistics)  Conventional -0.379*** 0.060 -6.35 -0.496            -0.262 
 Bias-Corrected -0.303*** 0.060 -5.07 -0.420           -0.186 
 Robust  -0.303*** 0.072 -4.21 -0.444            -0.162 
Higher Education (LiTS III)  Conventional -0.181*** 0.063 -2.86 -0.306            -0.057 
 Bias-Corrected     0.099 0.063 1.56 -0.026            0.223 
 Robust      0.099 0.125 0.79 -0.147             0.345 
Higher Education (Official 
Statistics)  
Conventional 
-0.106*** 0.020 -5.22 -0.146           -0.066 
 Bias-Corrected -0.073*** 0.020 -3.61 -0.113           -0.033 
 Robust  -0.073*** 0.026 -2.85 -0.123           -0.023 
Literacy  Conventional -0.001*** 0.0004 -2.93 -0.002           -0.0004 
 Bias-Corrected -0.001*** 0.0004 -3.00 -0.002           -0.0004 
 Robust  -0.001*** 0.0005 -2.93 -0.002           -0.0004 
Trust in Government Conventional      -0.051 0.142 1.00 -0.330            0.228 
 Bias-Corrected 0.409*** 0.142 2.87  0.129            0.688 
 Robust  0.409 0.290 1.41 -0.159            0.976 
Market Economy Conventional -0.123 0.110 -1.12 -0.339           0.092 
 Bias-Corrected -0.262*** 0.110 -2.38 -0.477           -0.046 
 Robust  -0.262 0.229 -1.14 -0.710           0.186 
Democracy Conventional -0.226* 0.128 -1.77 -0.476            0.024 
 Bias-Corrected  -0.280** 0.128 -2.19 -0.530           -0.030 
 Robust  -0.280 0.259 -1.08 -0.788            0.228 
Income equality Conventional  0.016 0.110  0.15 -0.200            0.232 
 Bias-Corrected       0.561*** 0.110 -5.10 -0.776           -0.345 
 Robust       0.561** 0.231 -2.43 -1.014           -0.108 
Competition Conventional   -0.931*** 0.343 -2.71 -1.603         -0.258 
 Bias-Corrected    1.194*** 0.343   -3.48 -1.866         -0.521 
 Robust       1.194 0.773 -1.54 -2.708          0.321 
Center-Left Vote Conventional -0.066* 0.037 -1.77 -0.139          0.007 
 Bias-Corrected -0.045 0.037 -1.22 -0.118          0.027 
 Robust  -0.045 0.049 -0.94 -0.141          0.050 
Right-wing Vote Conventional -0.008 0.014 -0.58 -0.036          0.020 
 Bias-Corrected -0.009 0.014 -0.67 -0.037          0.018 
 Robust  -0.009 0.018 -0.51 -0.046          0.027 
Respect for Authority Conventional 1.266*** 0.345 3.67 0.589          1.942 
 Bias-Corrected 2.116*** 0.345 6.13 1.439          2.792 
 Robust  2.116*** 0.789 2.68  0.568          3.662 
Law Obedience Conventional -1.731*** 0.395 -4.39 -2.505          -0.958 
 Bias-Corrected -2.011*** 0.395 -5.10 -2.784          -1.237 
 Robust    -2.011** 0.872 -2.31 -3.719          -0.302 
Generalized Trust Conventional    -0.217 0.146 -1.48 -0.503          0.070 
 Bias-Corrected  0.561*** 0.146  3.84  0.274           0.847 
 Robust     0.561* 0.294  1.91 -0.016          1.137 
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Table A.6: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Livonia vs. Lettgallia (1561 borders) – Bandwidth of 100 
km 
Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Outcome Variable Method Coefficient  Std. Err.      z 95% Confidence Interval  
Income (LiTS III)  Conventional    -0.134 0.225 -0.60 -0.575            0.307 
 Bias-Corrected    -0.122 0.225 -0.54 -0.563            0.319 
 Robust     -0.122 0.595 -0.21 -1.287            1.044 
Higher Education (LiTS III)  Conventional     0.010 0.100  0.10 -0.185            0.205 
 Bias-Corrected     0.104 0.100 1.04 -0.091           0.299 
 Robust      0.104 0.315  0.33 -0.513            0.720 
Trust in Government Conventional   -0.338    0.258 -1.31       -0.843            0.168 
 Bias-Corrected   -0.050    0.258 -0.20       -0.556            0.455 
 Robust     -0.050    0.932 -0.05        -1.878           1.777 
Market Economy Conventional    0.010 0.188  0.05 -0.359            0.379 
 Bias-Corrected -0.964*** 0.188 -5.12 -1.333           -0.595 
 Robust    -0.964 0.664 -1.45 -2.265           0.337 
Democracy Conventional    0.251    0.213  1.18 -0.166            0.668 
 Bias-Corrected    0.093    0.213  0.44 -0.324            0.509 
 Robust     0.093    0.734  0.13 -1.347           1.532 
Income equality Conventional     0.428** 0.194  2.21  0.048           0.808 
 Bias-Corrected    -0.464** 0.194 -2.39 -0.845          -0.084 
 Robust     -0.464 0.483  -0.96 -1.411           0.483 
Competition Conventional    1.388*    0.699  1.99  0.018            2.758 
 Bias-Corrected    3.041    0.699  4.35  1.671           4.411 
 Robust     3.041    2.155  1.41 -1.182           7.264 
Respect for Authority Conventional    -1.188*    0.640 -1.86 -2.442            0.065 
 Bias-Corrected     0.330    0.640  0.52 -0.923            1.584 
 Robust      0.330    2.130  0.16  -3.843           4.504 
Law Obedience Conventional    -0.529 0.724 -0.73 -1.948            0.890 
 Bias-Corrected -6.286*** 0.724 -8.68 -7.705          -4.867 
 Robust  -6.286*** 2.276 -2.76 -10.747          -1.825 
Generalized Trust Conventional   -0.284    0.230 -1.24       -0.734             0.166 
 Bias-Corrected    0.340    0.230 1.48 -0.110            0.790 
 Robust     0.340    0.826 0.41   -1.279            1.959 
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Table A.7: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Estland vs. Livonia (1561 borders) – Bandwidth of 100 km 
Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Outcome Variable Method Coefficient  Std. Err.     z 95% Confidence Interval  
Income (LiTS III)  Conventional     0.296**    0.148  2.00  0.005           0.587 
 Bias-Corrected 0.420***    0.148  2.83   0.129           0.711 
 Robust      0.420*    0.218  1.93 -0.006           0.846 
Higher Education (LiTS III)  Conventional     0.036    0.060  0.60        -0.082           0.155 
 Bias-Corrected  0.192***    0.060  3.17   0.073           0.310 
 Robust      0.192**    0.091  2.12  0.014          0.369 
Trust in Government Conventional    -0.122    0.208 -0.59  -0.529           0.285 
 Bias-Corrected    -0.047    0.208  -0.23  -0.455           0.360 
 Robust     -0.047    0.300  -0.16 -0.634           0.540 
Market Economy Conventional    -0.275    0.126 -2.18  -0.523           -0.028 
 Bias-Corrected    -0.226    0.126  -1.79  -0.474           0.022 
 Robust     -0.226    0.193  -1.17 -0.604           0.151 
Democracy Conventional     0.278**    0.126  2.20  0.030           0.697 
 Bias-Corrected  0.527***    0.126  4.18 0.280           1.031 
 Robust      0.527***    0.189  2.79  0.157           0.898 
Income equality Conventional    -0.046    0.121 -0.38  -0.282           0.191 
 Bias-Corrected    -0.252**    0.121  -2.09  -0.488           -0.016 
 Robust     -0.252    0.176  -1.43 -0.597           0.093 
Competition Conventional     0.285    0.381  0.75 -0.461           1.031 
 Bias-Corrected     0.203    0.381  0.53        -0.543           0.949 
 Robust      0.203    0.527  0.39  -0.830           1.236 
Respect for Authority Conventional     0.793*    0.411  1.93        -0.013           1.598 
 Bias-Corrected     0.759*    0.411  1.85        -0.046           1.565 
 Robust      0.759    0.578  1.31 -0.374           1.893 
Law Obedience Conventional    -0.590    0.553 -1.07  -1.675           0.494 
 Bias-Corrected    -0.186    0.553  -0.34  -1.270           0.899 
 Robust     -0.186    0.842  -0.22 -1.836           1.465 
Generalized Trust Conventional    -0.463***    0.174 -2.66  -0.803           0.122 
 Bias-Corrected    -0.198    0.174  -1.14  -0.538           0.143 
 Robust     -0.198    0.259  -0.76 -0.706           0.310 
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Table A.8: Baltic Jews and current income  






























   
Lettgallia   -0.299 
[0.042]*** 
  -0.699 
[0.427] 
Estland    0.038 
[0.041] 
  0.162 
[0.07]** 
Courland   -0.165 
[0.040]*** 
  -0.429 
[0.252]* 




























Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.046 0.298 0.584 0.014 3.465e-07 0.019 
F-statistic of instrument in 1st stage    0.63 0.00002 1.08 
Distance to Riga/Reval km 
(Coefficient from 1st stage) 






Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Russian Empire district level regression. Livonia is the 
reference group for Lettgallia, Estland and Courland. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The diversity 
index is composed of the German, Jewish, Russian, Polish, Swedish and Lithuanian shares of the 1897 general 
census divided by the respective Latvian or Estonian share. Current income corresponds to the log-version of the 
2016 average monthly wage at the sub-municipal/municipal level.  
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Table A.9: Baltic Jews and current literacy  






























   
Lettgallia   -0.001 
[0.001] 
  -0.004 
[0.006] 
Estland    -0.001 
[0.0006]* 
  0.0004 
[0.001] 
Courland   -0.0001 
[0.001] 
  -0.004 
[0.003] 






























Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.097 0.157 0.578 0.014 0.086 0.074 
F-statistic of instrument in 1st 
stage 
   0.63 0.00002 1.08 
Distance to capital city 
(Riga/Reval) km 
(Coefficient from 1st stage) 






Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Russian Empire district level regression. Livonia is the 
reference group for Lettgallia, Estland and Courland. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The diversity 
index is composed of the German, Jewish, Russian, Polish, Swedish and Lithuanian shares of the 1897 general 
census divided by the respective Latvian or Estonian share.  
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Table A.10: Baltic Jews and current higher education  






























   
Lettgallia    -0.071 
[0.019]*** 
  -0.214 
[0.159] 
Estland     0.032 
[0.026] 
  0.076 
[0.036] 
Courland   -0.074 
[0.015]*** 
  -0.168 
[0.092]* 




























Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.003 0.163 0.508 0.014 0.086 0.074 
F-statistic of instrument in 1st stage    0.63 0.00002 1.08 
Distance to Riga/Reval km 
(Coefficient from 1st stage) 






Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Russian Empire district level regression. Livonia is the 
reference group for Lettgallia, Estland and Courland. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The diversity 
index is composed of the German, Jewish, Russian, Polish, Swedish and Lithuanian shares of the 1897 general 
census divided by the respective Latvian or Estonian share.  
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Table A.11: Baltic Swedes and current income  






























   
Lettgallia   -0.265 
[0.052]*** 
  -0.311 
[0.058]*** 
Estland    0.022 
[0.045] 
  0.619 
[0.357]* 
Courland   -0.143 
[0.037]*** 
  -0.133 
[0.051]*** 




























Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.041 0.305 0.560 0.011 0.010 0.015 
F-statistic of instrument in 1st stage    2.36 2.22 0.79 
Distance to Riga/Reval km 
(Coefficient from 1st stage) 






Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Russian Empire district level regression. Livonia is the 
reference group for Lettgallia, Estland and Courland. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The diversity 
index is composed of the German, Jewish, Russian, Polish, Swedish and Lithuanian shares of the 1897 general 
census divided by the respective Latvian or Estonian share. Current income corresponds to the log-version of the 
2016 average monthly wage at the sub-municipal/municipal level.  
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Table A.12: Baltic Swedes and current literacy  































   
Lettgallia    0.001 
[0.001]* 
  0.0007 
[0.0007] 
Estland    -0.0008 
[0.001] 
  0.006 
[0.004] 
Courland    0.0001 
[0.001] 
   0.0002 
[0.0007] 




























Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.115 0.194 0.258 0.011 0.010 0.015 
F-statistic of instrument in 1st stage    2.36 2.22 0.79 
Distance to Riga/Reval km 
(Coefficient from 1st stage) 






Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Russian Empire district level regression. Livonia is the 
reference group for Lettgallia, Estland and Courland. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The diversity 
index is composed of the German, Jewish, Russian, Polish, Swedish and Lithuanian shares of the 1897 general 
census divided by the respective Latvian or Estonian share. Current income corresponds to the log-version of the 
2016 average monthly wage at the sub-municipal/municipal level.  
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Table A.13: Baltic Swedes and current higher education  






























   
Lettgallia   -0.059 
[0.021]*** 
  -0.074 
[0.021]*** 
Estland     0.042 
[0.030] 
  0.241 
[0.119]** 
Courland   -0.065 
[0.015]*** 
  -0.061 
[0.018]*** 










Diversity index %   0.002 
[0.001]*** 
















Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.006 0.164 0.500 0.011 0.010 0.015 
F-statistic of instrument in 1st stage    2.36 2.22 0.79 
Distance to Riga/Reval km 
(Coefficient from 1st stage) 






Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Russian Empire district level regression. Livonia is the 
reference group for Lettgallia, Estland and Courland. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The diversity 
index is composed of the German, Jewish, Russian, Polish, Swedish and Lithuanian shares of the 1897 general 
census divided by the respective Latvian or Estonian share. Current income corresponds to the log-version of the 
2016 average monthly wage at the sub-municipal/municipal level.  
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Table A.14: Baltic Russians and current income  






























   
Lettgallia   -0.260 
[0.082]*** 
   1.380 
[3.246] 
Estland    0.028 
[0.043] 
  0.105 
[0.166] 
Courland   -0.143 
[0.037]*** 
  -0.186 
[0.239] 










Diversity index %   0.004 
[0.001]*** 
















Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.116 0.308 0.560 0.114 0.077 0.007 
F-statistic of instrument in 1st stage    5.37 3.30 0.26 
Distance to Riga/Reval km 
(Coefficient from 1st stage) 






Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Russian Empire district level regression. Livonia is the 
reference group for Lettgallia, Estland and Courland. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The diversity 
index is composed of the German, Jewish, Russian, Polish, Swedish and Lithuanian shares of the 1897 general 
census divided by the respective Latvian or Estonian share. Current income corresponds to the log-version of the 
2016 average monthly wage at the sub-municipal/municipal level.  
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Table A.15: Baltic Russians and current literacy  






























   
Lettgallia    0.002 
[0.001]* 
   0.022 
[0.040] 
Estland    -0.001 
[0.0007]* 
  -0.0004 
[0.003] 
Courland    0.00005 
[0.00005] 
  -0.0005 
[0.003] 




























Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.001 0.083 0.256 0.114 0.077 0.007 
F-statistic of instrument in 1st 
stage 
   5.37 3.30 0.26 
Distance to Riga/Reval km 
(Coefficient from 1st stage) 






Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Russian Empire district level regression. Livonia is the 
reference group for Lettgallia, Estland and Courland. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The diversity 
index is composed of the German, Jewish, Russian, Polish, Swedish and Lithuanian shares of the 1897 general 
census divided by the respective Latvian or Estonian share. Current income corresponds to the log-version of the 
2016 average monthly wage at the sub-municipal/municipal level.  
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Table A.16: Baltic Russians and current higher education  






























   
Lettgallia   -0.101 
[0.040]** 
   0.535 
[1.272] 
Estland    0.026 
[0.023] 
  0.056 
[0.075] 
Courland   -0.064 
[0.015]*** 
  -0.080 
[0.091] 










Diversity index %   0.001 
[0.0004]*** 
















Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.003 0.205 0.528 0.114 0.077 0.007 
F-statistic of instrument in 1st stage    5.37 3.30 0.26 
Distance to Riga/Reval km 
(Coefficient from 1st stage) 






Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Russian Empire district level regression. Livonia is the 
reference group for Lettgallia, Estland and Courland. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The diversity 
index is composed of the German, Jewish, Russian, Polish, Swedish and Lithuanian shares of the 1897 general 
census divided by the respective Latvian or Estonian share. Current income corresponds to the log-version of the 
2016 average monthly wage at the sub-municipal/municipal level.  
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Table A.17: Baltic Poles and current income  






























   
Lettgallia   -0.266 
[0.051]*** 
  -0.280 
[0.164]* 
Estland    0.029 
[0.043] 
  0.065 
[0.058] 
Courland   -0.139 
[0.037]*** 
  -0.014 
[0.060] 










Diversity index %   0.004 
[0.002]*** 
















Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.067 0.303 0.563 0.049 0.021 0.024 
F-statistic of instrument in 1st stage    5.62 3.16 1.41 
Distance to Riga/Reval km 
(Coefficient from 1st stage) 






Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Russian Empire district level regression. Livonia is the 
reference group for Lettgallia, Estland and Courland. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The diversity 
index is composed of the German, Jewish, Russian, Polish, Swedish and Lithuanian shares of the 1897 general 
census divided by the respective Latvian or Estonian share. Current income corresponds to the log-version of the 
2016 average monthly wage at the sub-municipal/municipal level.  
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Table A.18: Baltic Poles and current literacy  






























   
Lettgallia    0.001 
[0.0005]** 
   0.001 
[0.002] 
Estland    -0.001 
[0.0006]* 
  -0.0009 
[0.0008] 
Courland    0.0004 
[0.0005] 
   0.002 
[0.0009]** 











Diversity index %   0.00005 
[0.00001]*** 

















Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.068 0.155 0.350 0.049 0.021 0.024 
F-statistic of instrument in 1st 
stage 
   5.62 3.16 1.41 
Distance to Riga/Reval km 
(Coefficient from 1st stage) 






Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Russian Empire district level regression. Livonia is the 
reference group for Lettgallia, Estland and Courland. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The diversity 
index is composed of the German, Jewish, Russian, Polish, Swedish and Lithuanian shares of the 1897 general 
census divided by the respective Latvian or Estonian share. Current income corresponds to the log-version of the 
2016 average monthly wage at the sub-municipal/municipal level.  
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Table A.19: Baltic Poles and current higher education  






























   
Lettgallia   -0.058 
[0.022]** 
  -0.063 
[0.057] 
Estland    0.027 
[0.026] 
  0.041 
[0.031] 
Courland   -0.067 
[0.015]*** 
  -0.019 
[0.030] 










Diversity index %   0.001 
[0.0006]** 
















Observations 58 58 58 58 58 58 
R-squared 0.003 0.164 0.486 0.049 0.021 0.024 
F-statistic of instrument in 1st stage    5.62 3.16 1.41 
Distance to Riga/Reval km 
(Coefficient from 1st stage) 






Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Russian Empire district level regression. Livonia is the 
reference group for Lettgallia, Estland and Courland. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The diversity 
index is composed of the German, Jewish, Russian, Polish, Swedish and Lithuanian shares of the 1897 general 
census divided by the respective Latvian or Estonian share. Current income corresponds to the log-version of the 
2016 average monthly wage at the sub-municipal/municipal level.  
19 
 
Table A.20: Covariate-adjusted RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Courland vs. Livonia (1561 borders)  
Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bandwidth is 100 km. Covariates include big city and 
capital city agglomeration dummies.   
Outcome Variable Method Coefficient  Std. Err.     z 95% Confidence Interval  
Income (LiTS III)  Conventional 0.121 0.155 -0.78 -0.425             0.184 
 Bias-Corrected 0.216 0.155 1.39 -0.088             0.521 
 Robust  1.216 0.366 0.59 -0.501             0.933 
Income (Official Statistics)  Conventional -0.216*** 0.038 -5.65 -0.290            -0.141 
 Bias-Corrected -0.186*** 0.038 -4.87 -0.261            -0.111 
 Robust  -0.186*** 0.045 -4.11 -0.274            -0.097 
Higher Education (LiTS III)  Conventional -0.104 0.064 -1.62 -0.230             0.022 
 Bias-Corrected 0.040 0.064 0.62 0.086             0.166 
 Robust  0.040 0.128 0.31 -0.211             0.291 
Higher Education (Official 
Statistics)  
Conventional 
-0.054*** 0.014 -3.78  -0.081           -0.025 
 Bias-Corrected -0.054*** 0.014 -2.66 -0.065           -0.010 
 Robust  -0.038** 0.017 -2.24 -0.071           -0.005 
Literacy  Conventional -0.002*** 0.0004 -4.06 -0.002           -0.0004 
 Bias-Corrected -0.002*** 0.0004 -3.27 -0.002           -0.001 
 Robust  -0.002*** 0.0005 -2.98 -0.002           -0.0005 
Trust in Government Conventional -0.034 0.142 -0.24 -0.312            0.244 
 Bias-Corrected 0.423*** 0.142 2.98 0.145           0.700 
 Robust  0.423 0.286 1.48 -0.137           0.983 
Market Economy Conventional -0.107 0.110 -0.97 -0.324           0.109 
 Bias-Corrected -0.244** 0.110 -2.21 -0.461           -0.028 
 Robust  -0.244 0.229 -1.07 -0.692           0.204 
Democracy Conventional -0.088 0.128 -0.69 -0.338            0.163 
 Bias-Corrected -0.176 0.128 -1.38 -0.426           0.074 
 Robust  -0.176 0.260 -0.68 -0.686            0.334 
Income equality Conventional 0.167 0.106  1.58 -0.040            0.374 
 Bias-Corrected -0.391*** 0.106 -3.70 -0.598           -0.184 
 Robust  -0.391* 0.223 -1.75 -0.828            0.046 
Competition Conventional -1.063*** 0.336 -3.17 -1.721          -0.405 
 Bias-Corrected -1.712*** 0.336 -5.10 -2.369         -1.054 
 Robust  -1.712** 0.760 -2.25 -3.202          -0.221 
Center-Left Vote Conventional -0.015 0.027  0.58 -0.068          0.038 
 Bias-Corrected -0.022 0.027 0.43 -0.075          0.032 
 Robust  -0.022 0.035  0.53 -0.090          0.046 
Right-wing Vote Conventional -0.013 0.010 -1.29 -0.033          0.007 
 Bias-Corrected -0.009 0.010 -0.92 -0.029          0.011 
 Robust  -0.009 0.012 -0.80 -0.032          0.014 
Respect for Authority Conventional 1.585*** 0.327 4.85 0.945          2.226 
 Bias-Corrected 2.767*** 0.327 8.47 2.127          3.407 
 Robust  2.767*** 0.742 3.73 1.313          4.221 
Law Obedience Conventional -1.512*** 0.372 -4.07 -2.240          -0.784 
 Bias-Corrected -2.151*** 0.372 -5.79 -2.879         -1.423 
 Robust      -2.151*** 0.830 -2.59 -3.778          -0.525 
Generalized Trust Conventional -0.101 0.146 -0.69 -0.388          0.185 
 Bias-Corrected   0.577*** 0.146 3.95  0.291         0.864 
 Robust  0.577* 0.295 1.96 -0.0001         1.155 
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Table A.21: Covariate-adjusted RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Lettgallia vs. Livonia (1561 borders)  
Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bandwidth is 100 km. Covariates include big city and 
capital city agglomeration dummies.   
Outcome Variable Method Coefficient  Std. Err.     z 95% Confidence Interval  
Income (LiTS III)  Conventional -0.068 0.218 -0.31 -0.496             0.359 
 Bias-Corrected -0.181 0.218 -0.83 -0.608             0.247 
 Robust  -0.181 0.585 -0.31 -1.328             0.996 
Higher Education (LiTS III)  Conventional  0.089 0.094 0.95 -0.095             0.273 
 Bias-Corrected -0.018 0.094 -0.20 0.203             0.166 
 Robust  -0.018 0.280 -0.07 -0.567             0.530 
Trust in Government Conventional -0.306 0.250 -1.23 -0.795            0.183 
 Bias-Corrected -0.097 0.250 -0.39 -0.586            0.392 
 Robust  -0.097 0.897 -0.11 -1.854            1.661 
Market Economy Conventional -0.035 0.190 -0.19 -0.409           0.338 
 Bias-Corrected -0.877*** 0.190 -4.60 -1.250           -0.503 
 Robust  -0.877 0.673 -1.30 -2.196           0.442 
Democracy Conventional  0.296 0.217 1.36 -0.129            0.721 
 Bias-Corrected 0.012 0.217 0.06 -0.413           0.437 
 Robust  0.012 0.750 0.02 -1.458            1.482 
Income equality Conventional  0.268 0.190 1.41 -0.105            0.640 
 Bias-Corrected -0.227 0.190 -1.19 -0.600           0.146 
 Robust  -0.227 0.476 -0.48 -1.160           0.706 
Competition Conventional 2.086*** 0.683 3.05 0.747          3.425 
 Bias-Corrected 1.892*** 0.683 2.77 0.553          3.231 
 Robust  1.892 2.181 0.87 -2.383          6.166 
Respect for Authority Conventional -1.495** 0.587 -2.55 -2.646         -0.344 
 Bias-Corrected 0.821 0.587 1.40 -0.330         1.972 
 Robust  0.821 2.166 0.38 -3.423          5.066 
Law Obedience Conventional -0.185 0.664 -0.28 -1.486          1.117 
 Bias-Corrected -6.823*** 0.664 -10.27 -8.125         -5.521 
 Robust  -6.823*** 2.057 -3.32 -10.854         -2.792 
Generalized Trust Conventional -0.155 0.228 -0.68 -0.603          0.292 
 Bias-Corrected 0.166 0.228 0.73 -0.282          0.613 
 Robust  0.166 0.839 0.20 -1.478          1.809 
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Table A.22: Covariate-adjusted RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Estland vs. Livonia (1561 borders)  
Note: Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bandwidth is 100 km. Covariates include big city and 
capital city agglomeration dummies. 
Outcome Variable Method Coefficient  Std. Err.     z 95% Confidence Interval  
Income (LiTS III)  Conventional 0.330** 0.144 2.30 0.048             0.611 
 Bias-Corrected 0.397*** 0.144 2.76 0.116             0.679 
 Robust  0.397* 0.207 1.92 -0.007             0.802 
Higher Education (LiTS III)  Conventional 0.078 0.058 1.34 -0.036             0.192 
 Bias-Corrected 0.139* 0.058 2.39 0.025             0.253 
 Robust  0.139 0.087 1.61 -0.030             0.309 
Trust in Government Conventional -0.078 0.199 -0.39 -0.469            0.312 
 Bias-Corrected -0.102 0.199 -0.51 -0.492          0.289 
 Robust  -0.102 0.283 -0.36 -0.657            0.453 
Market Economy Conventional -0.287** 0.125 -2.29 -0.532           -0.042 
 Bias-Corrected -0.193 0.125 -1.54 -0.438           0.052 
 Robust  -0.193 0.191 -1.01 -0.567           0.181 
Democracy Conventional 0.301** 0.118 2.55 0.070            0.533 
 Bias-Corrected 0.511*** 0.118 4.32 0.279           0.742 
 Robust  0.511*** 0.176 2.90 0.165            0.856 
Income equality Conventional -0.042 0.116 -0.36 -0.268            0.185 
 Bias-Corrected -0.259** 0.116 -2.24 -0.486           -0.032 
 Robust  -0.259 0.170 -1.52 -0.593           0.075 
Competition Conventional 0.268 0.340 0.79 -0.399          0.935 
 Bias-Corrected 0.281 0.340 0.82 -0.386         0.948 
 Robust  0.281 0.469 0.60 -0.639          1.200 
Respect for Authority Conventional 0.838** 0.387 2.17 0.080          1.596 
 Bias-Corrected 0.670* 0.387 1.73 -0.088         1.428 
 Robust  0.670 0.535 1.25 -0.378          1.717 
Law Obedience Conventional -0.471 0.513 -0.92 -1.477          0.534 
 Bias-Corrected -0.341 0.513 -0.67 -1.347         0.664 
 Robust  -0.341 0.773 -0.44 -1.857          1.174 
Generalized Trust Conventional -0.468*** 0.170 -2.75 -0.801          -0.134 
 Bias-Corrected -0.179 0.170 -1.05 -0.512          0.155 
 Robust  -0.179 0.253 -0.71 -0.675          0.318 
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Source: Own maps. Borders of governorates, towns and districts in 1898 and borders of sub-municipal units (in 




Figure A.2: Courland/Livonia and Lettgallia/Livonia borders with a bandwidth of 50 and 100 km 
 
Source: Own maps. Borders of governorates, towns and districts in 1898 and borders of sub-municipal units (in Latvia) and municipalities (in Estonia) 
today. 
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